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THE WORK OF THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT
FOR THE YEAR 1946
STATISTICAL SURVEY
Guy A. MAGRUDER, JR.*
This survey is based upon the cases heard in 1946 for which opinions
were handed down within that year. Of the 181 majority opinions dealt
with, four represent two separate cases each, making a total of 195 cases
heard and disposed of by opinion in 1946. Four of the opinions were originally written as divisional opinions and later adopted as the opinions of
the court en banc. Four dissenting opinions and three separate concurring
opinions were handed down. The total number of opinions for 1946 reflects
a continuation of the decrease noted in 1945 of the number of opinions by
the court.'
There were no changes in the personnel of the court effective during
1946.2

Table I indicates the distribution of these opinions among the divisions
of the court.
TABLE I
NUMBER OF OPINIONS WRITrEN BY EACH DIVISION

En Banc ..........................................
Division Number One ..
............................................
Division Number Two ...........................
Total ......................................................................................

53
.. 71
57
181

Table II is a classification of the opinions handed down during 1946
according to the dominant issues involved. Since many of the cases involved
*Chairman, Board of Student Editors.

1. Totals for the preceding ten years are as follows: 1936, 369; 1937, 277;

1938, 303; 1939, 290; 1940, 282; 1941, 336; 1942, 293; 1943, 306; 1944, 251; 1945, 197.

2. Judge Ernest S. Gantt retired December 31, 1946; Judge Roscoe P.

Conkling appointed, took office January 1, 1947.
(371)
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several important issues, the figures are only an approximation due to the
necessity of placing such cases in one category in a more or less arbitrary
fashion.
TABLE II
TOPICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS

Adoption .................................. ............................................................
Appeal and Error ................... ............................................................
Attorney and Client .............. ...........................................................
Constitutional Law ................ ............................................................
1.
Contracts .................................. ..........................................
Corporations .......................... ............................................................
Counties .................................. ............................................................
Courts ...................................... ..........................................
I................
Criminal Law .......................... ............................................................
Damages .................................. ............................................................
Divorce .................................... ............................................................
Elections .................................. ............................................................
Equity ...................................... ...........................................................
Evidence .................................. ............................................................
Habeas Corpus ........................ ............................................................
Insurance ................................
...........................................................
Joint Enterprise ...................... ............................................................
Judgment ................................ ............................................................
Landlord and Tenant ............ ............................................................
M andamus .............................. ............................................................
M aster and Servant ................ ............................................................
Mortgages ................................ ............................................................
Municipal Corporations ........ ............................................................
Negligence (Automobiles) ...............................................................
Negotiable Instruments ........ ............................................................
Other Negligence .................... ............................................................
Partnership .............................. ............................................................
Patents .................................... ............................................................
Pleading .................................. ............................................................
Practice and Procedure ........ ...........................................................
Principal and Agent .............. ...............................
I............................
Prohibition .............................. ............................................................
Real Property ................... ............................................................
Railroads .................................. ............................................................
Statutes ....................................
..........................................
I..........
Taxati6n

.................... ............................................................

Tort (Pther than negligence) .........................................................
Trusts ....................................... ...........
....
.........
...............................
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss4/1
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----. - 2
Unemployment Compensation --------------------------------------4
Wills and Administration ................................................................
8
Workmen's Compehsation ..............................................................

181
Total -----------------------------------------------------Table III indicates the disposition of the 181 cases handled during 1946.
The phrases used to indicate the disposition of the cases are those of the
judges and commissioners themselves, as far as such is practicable for this
purpose.
TABLE III
DISPOSITION OF LITIGATION

1
Appeal Dismissed -----------------------------------------------1
Appeal Dismissed and Judgment Affirmed ------------------------------Cause Retransferred to Court of Appeals .................................. 1
10
Cause Transferred to Court of Appeals --------------------------------5
Decree Affirmed -------------------------------------------------Decree Affirmed, Judgment on Counterclaim Reversed, and
1
Cause Remanded with Directions ---------------------------------Decree Reversed and Cause Remanded with Directions -------- 1
89
Judgment Affirmed ----------------------------------------------Judgment Affirmed and Cause Remanded for Further Proceed1
ings -------------------------------.-.--------------------1
Judgment Affirmed and Cause Remanded with Directions ......
1
Judgment Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part ----------------------Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause Rem anded ........................................................................................ 3
Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause Re2
manded with Directions ----------------------------------------2
Judgment Affirmed on Condition of Remittitur ---------------------------Judgment and Decree Modified, as Modified Affirmed, and
1
Cause Remanded ---------------------------------------------7
Judgment Reversed ----------------------------------------------1
Judgment Reversed with Directions ----------------------------------12
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded -----------------------------Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded with Directions ----13
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded; Opinion of Court of
1
Appeals Quashed ...................................---------------------------------1
- - ..................------------.
Opinion Quashed ----....----------------------------.-.Opinion of Court of Appeals Quashed; Judgment of Trial Court
Affirmed ---------------------------------------1
Opinion of Court of Appeals Quashed.in so far as it Coiflicts,Judgment of Circuit Court Affirmed, and Cause Remand1
7---------------------------------------------ed for Further Proceedings ------Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947
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Order Affirmed .................................................................................
Order Granting New Trial Affirmed ..............................................
Order Granting New Trial Set Aside and Cause Remanded with
D irections ..................................................................................
Peremptory Writ in Prohibition Ordered Issued ..........................
Peremptory Writ of Mandamus Denied ......................................
Peremptory Writ of Mandamus Granted ...................................
Petitioner (in Habeas Corpus Proceeding) Discharged ............
Preliminary Rule in Prohibition Made Absolute ......................
Provisional Rule in Prohibition Made Absolute .........................
Provisional Rule in Prohibition Made Absolute with Directions
Provisional Rule in Prohibition Quashed .................
Writ of Certiorari Quashed .............................................................
Writ of Habeas Corpus Quashed and Petitioner Remanded to
Custody .....................................................................................
Writ of Mandamus Denied ..........................
Writ of Mandamus Issued .....................
Writ of Mandamus Quashed ............................................................
Writ of Ouster Issued ........................................................................
Writ of Prohibition Denied ...........................................................
Total ............................................................................................

3

1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1...
1
3
1...

1....
1
1
1

181

Table IV shows the disposition of the motions subsequent to decision
capable of determination from the records now available. Cases in which
rehearings were granted or which were transferred to the court e- banc are
necessarily not included in this study.
TABLE IV
MOTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO DECISION
Motion for Rehearing Denied .....................................................
Motion to Transfer to Court En Banc Denied ........................
Motion to Modify Denied ....................................

76
13
2

APPELLATE PRACTICE
CHALES V. GARNETT*
THE JURISDICTION

OF THE SUPREME COURT

While the new Constitution, effective March 30, 1945, did not undertake to alter the previous constitutional limitations upon the jurisdiction of
*Attorney, Kansas City, LL.B., Kansas City School of Law, 1912.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss4/1
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the supreme court, the court was given the power to make final disposition
of all cases coming to it from the courts of appeal, whether by certification,
transfer, or certiorari.' Cases now reaching the supreme court from the
courts of appeal are being finally disposed of and not merely remanded to
the courts of appeal under opinions merely affirming or quashing opinions
of the lower appellate court. During the year under review, the case of
Helm v. Inter-Itsurance Exchange2 furnishes an illustration of this new
constitutional provision. It represents a decided improvement in appellate
review and will shorten the time of final disposition of those cases which
reach the supreme court from the courts of appeal.
Jurisdictional questions still present themselves, and the importance of a
thorough investigation of such questions at the time appeal is taken cannot
be overlooked. The court found it necessary to transfer no less than ten
cases to the courts of appeal during the year under review. Two such cases
were transferred because of the jurisdictional amount involved. In Warwmac
v. Crawfords an appeal was taken to the supreme court from a decree directing the trustees under a will to sell such number of shares of a certain common stock, a part of the trust estate, as the trustees, in their discretion,
believed they should sell so as to bring about a sound diversification of the
assets of the trust estate. Appellate jurisdiction in the supreme court was
sought to be established upon the ground that the sale would reduce the income from the trust assets by more than $7500, but the court held that,
because the number of shares to be sold was left to the discretion of the
trustees, and because there was no showing as to the income that might
be received from the re-invested funds, the amount of either loss or gain
by the diversification ordered by the decree appealed from was merely
speculative, leaving the jurisdictional amount not affirmatively and certainly
established.
Wagner v. Mederacke,4 although an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment
in favor of defendant in a case where the prayer of the petition was for
more than $7500, was transferred because the record showed affirmatively
that the parties, at a pre-trial conference, bad agreed that the amount in
controversy was only $5000. The court held that such agreement, shown
in the record, was controlling over the allegations of the petition and that
1. Mo. CONST., 1945, Art. V, § 16.

2. 354 Mo. 935, 192 S. W. (2d) 417 (1946).
3. 192 S. W. (2d) 406 (Mo. 1946).
4. 354 Mo. 977, 192 S. W. (2d) 865 (1946).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947
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jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the pleading if, upon the whole record,
the jurisdictional amount is otherwise shown. The admission at the pretrial conference was held to be "In substitution of the jurisdictional facts

alleged in the petition."
In Farmerv. Littlefield5 the action was in partition, and was defended
upon the ground that under the terms of the will of the ancestor of the
parties, certain options granted to defendant were designed and intended
to withhold the right of partition until their expiration. The court again
points out that the mere fact that the action is in partition does not necessarily mean that title to real estate is involved; and, because there was no
denial of the respective rights of the parties and their interest in the land,
title to real estate was not involved within the meaning of the constitutional
provisions as to appellate jurisdiction and the cause was transferred to the
court of appeals. So, also, in Bussen v. Del Commiune, although the action
was a suit in equity to quiet title and to enjoin interference with possession
of real estate, the whole record showed that the actual controversy between
the parties concerned only a leasehold interest in the land and involved
possessory rights rather than title itself, leaving the supreme court without
jurisdiction of the appeal. Again, in Rice v. Rice7 an appeal in a will contest
was transferred to the court of appeals because, although the contestant contended that the will admitted to probate had been supplanted by a later
Will, not so admitted, which purported to dispose of real estate, there was
no affirmative showing in the record that the testator owned any real estate
at the time of his death or that the amount in dispute exceeded $7500.
In Hunter v. Hunters the action was in two counts, the first to determine title and the second in ejectment and for damages. The title upon

which plaintiff relied was a life estate. After the appeal had been perfected
plaintiff died, terminating the life estate, and defendant was the remainderman. Notwithstanding the rule that appellate jurisdiction over the subject
is determined upon the record at the time the appeal is granted, the court
ruled that the.rule. itself may be "too broad if taken literally" and, relying

largely upon decisions where constitutional questions have been disposed
of either by decision or waiver after the appeal and before appellate presenta5.
6.
7.
8.

195
195
195
197

S. W. (2d)
S. W. (2d)
S. W. (2d)
S. W. (2d)

657
666
515
299

(Mo. 1946).
(Mo. 1946).
(Mo. 1946).
(Mo. 1946).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss4/1
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tion, held that the termination of the life estate left the case as one not
involving title to real estate and transferred the appeal to the court of
appeals.
In PearsonDrainageDistrictv. Erhardt9 the court again ruled that taxes
levied by a drainage district are not included in the term "Revenue Laws
of this State" in the constitutional provisions defining appellate jurisdiction,
that phrase not referring to laws by which are authorized the assessment
of benefits to meet the expenses of given improvements. Accordingly, the
appeal was transferred to the court of appeal for disposition.
In State ex rel. v. Markwell v. Colt ° the action was in mandamus and
the appeal was from an order sustaining a motion to quash the alternative
writ, the question involved being whether or not an additional tax levy
which the writ of mandamus would have compelled would be in excess of
the constitutional limit of taxation of the school district. The motion to
quash was sustained upon the ground that the writ did not show that it
would not command a tax levy in excess of the constitutional limit. The
court held that it was without jurisdiction of the appeal, and transferred the
case to the court of appeals, because the issue presented was one of pleading
and that rulings on pleadings do not give the supreme court jurisdiction
"no matter what right is affected nor ,how that right is protected nor from
what source it comes."
In Dye v. School District No. 32" the court retained jurisdiction of an
appeal whbre a constitutional question was involved. The suit was one for
the recovery of salary claimed to be due a school teacher and the judgment
below was in favor of the school district. The constitutional question had
been raised by the school district and the lower court'had held that payment
of the' salary claim would be a violation of the constitution of the state. The
court points out that in Schildnackt v. City of Joplin'2 it had been held that,
in order to confer appellate jurisdiction on the supreme .court upon that
ground, the constitutional protection must have been "denied to the party
invoking it and such party must have been 'the losing .party in the trial
court. Notwithstanding that prior decision, the court, in the Dye case, said
"Now, the appellant here, being the losing party below, that far comes within
the quoted formula: but he did not raise the point and seek constitutional
9.
10.
11.
12.

196 S. W. (2d) 855 (Mo. 1946).
194 S. W. (2d) 1021 (Mo. 1946).
195 S.W. (2d) 874 "(1946).
327 Mo. 126,35 S.W. (2d) 35 (1931).
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protection there. On the contrary he maintained the constitution did not
apply. In so doing he took the negatitive side on the constitutional question raised by respondents. Having lost, he appealed and brings the same
question here. Consequently, we believe he is entitled to invoke our jurisTo
diction on the ground that a constitutional question is involved, ....
3
explained."'
or
that extent we think the Schildnecht case should be modified
RECORDS AND BRIEFS

Perhaps the most important decision of the year is the opinion of the
court en banc in Clader v. City of Neosho' 4 involving the right of the appellate court to grant further time for filing the transcript on appeal. In that
case the trial court had entered an order extending the time for filing the
transcript and the transcript was filed in the circuit court the day before
the extended time had expired but did not reach the appellate court until
eight days after the extended time. The appeal was taken to the Springfield
Court of Appeals and that court sustained a motion to dismiss because of
its view that only the trial court can extend the time and he must do it
before the time allowed by law or his former extension has expired.' Because
of the importance of the question involved the court of appeals certified
the case to the supreme court for final decision. The latter court declined
to adopt the view that only the trial court can make an extension of time,
holding that the appellate court can grant further time for filing the transcript
but that it should not be necessary for it to do so until after the expiration
of six months because during that time the trial court has full authority to
make extensions. In support of its ruling the court points to Section 6B of
the new code,' authorizing any court to permit an act to be done out of
time where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. The court
points out that the purpose of its rule is to expedite appeals by preventing
them from lying dormant in the trial court and to let the appellate court
know what cases are live cases; but that, where excusable neglect exists, the
trial court having lost its power to extend time, the appellate court can
make a finding of excusable neglect and enlarge the time for filing the
transcript.
13.
14.
15.
16.
! 847.6.

Supra note 11, at 876.
354 Mo. 1190, 193 S. W. (2d) 620 (1946).
192 S. W. (2d) 508, 511 (Mo. 1946).
Mo. LAws, 1943, p. 353, § 6(b), Mo.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss4/1
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Clearly, the court does not regard literal compliance with the new
code or its own rules with respect to the filing of the transcript on appeal
as jurisdictional. Thus, in Walsh, v. Terminal Railroad Association' the
transcript was filed in the circuit court forty-five days after the time provided by statute had expired, and no order enlarging time was obtained
either in the trial court or in the appellate court, but it is pointed out that
both the statute and the rule are new and that in similar circumstances
"some leniency has been extended." The court therefore extended the same
leniency and reviewed the case on its merits. Again, in Connoley v. Beyer
Crushed Rock Company' a motion to dismiss upon the ground that the
transcript was filed one day out of time was overruled where the record
showed that respondent had received his copy of the transcript before the
time had expired and no showing was made that the rights of respondent
were prejudiced by the delay in filing.
The case of Weller v. Hayes Truck Lines,"9 another decision by the
court en banc, deals with the question of whether or not the averments of
the notice of appeal called for by Section 131 of the new code are jurisdictional. In that case the notice of appeal recited that the appeal was taken
from the order overruling the motion for new trial; hence, it did not, in
terms, appeal from the judgment itself. The court held that while the
timely filing of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional it does not follow that
technical adherence to the required formal averments of the notice are likewise jurisdictional. Accordingly, the court -held that the averments of the
notice should be liberally construed to permit appellate review so long as
the opposing party is not misled. Upon that ground the motion to dismiss
for want of a proper notice was overruled and appellate jurisdiction was
exercised. The opinion drew dissent from Judge Leedy but no dissenting
opinion is reported. In deciding the question, the court extensively analyzed
the new code, the new constitution, the federal rules from which the new
code was taken, and federal decisions denouncing "the formalistic rigorism
of an earlier and outmoded time." The decision is in entire harmony with
the basic purpose of the new code to eliminate technical errors and secure
decision of the merits of cases brought to the appellate courts for review.
In Evans v. City of St. Louis2 0 a motion to dismiss appeal was sus17.
18.
19.
20.

196 S. W.
197 S. W.
197 S. W.
198 S. W.

(2d)
(2d)
(2d)
(2d)

192 (Mo. 1946).
653 (Mo. 1946).
657 (Mo. 1946).
9 (Mo. 1946).
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taned because the transcript of the record did not contain a copy of the
judgment or order appealed from. However, analysis of that decision raises
grave doubt as to whether or not any final judgment had, in fact, been rendered, because the petition was in numerous counts and only part of them
had been disposed of in the trial court, other counts remaining pending.
If liberal construction of the code is to be expected, it may well be that the
court would not insist upon an actual copy of the judgment appealed from
if the record conclusively showed a final judgment and its substance.
SCOPE AND EFFECT OF DECISIONS

In Wilson v. Kansas City Publi-c Service Company, 21 defendant's appeal
in a negligence action, the court merely followed earlier decisions in remanding the cause with directions to try only the issue of amount of damages
where errors relating to the measure of damages could not be cured by
remittitur. In Dodd v. Missouri-Kansas-TexasRailroad Compay,22 where
the plaintiff appealed from an order sustaining defendant's motion for new
trial when plaintiff refused:to enter a remittitur, the court held that it had
authority to review the question of amount of damages and reverse the
action with directions to enter such judgment as the court is of the opinion
ought to be entered, and not only reaffirmed its prior decision in the case
of Cole v. Railroad2 3 but pointed out that the opinion in the Cole case in
entire harmony with the provisions of the new code.
In.Lang v. Taussige4 the court points out that the mere fact that it had
jurisdiction of the first appeal does not create jurisdiction of a second appeal
where no question is ,raised as to the failure of the trial court to follow the
mandate on the first appeal. Accordingly the second appeal was transferred
to the court of appeals, jurisdictional amount notbeing shown. In Hardwick
v. Kansas City Gas Company2 5 the court held that, in an action against joint
tort feasors where the jury had found in favor of one and against the other
and plaintiff had not appealed, a general judgment reversing and remanding the cause did :not affect the finality of the verdict and judgment of the
defendant, in whose favor the. jury. had returned its verdict at first trial,
notwithstanding the, rule that a general judgment remanding the case to- be
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

354 Mo. 1032, 193 S.W. (2d) 5 (1946).
354 Mo. 1205, 193 S. W. (2d) 905 (1946)..
332 Mo. 999, 61 S. W. (2d) 344 (1933).
354 Mo. 930, 192 S. W. (2d) 407 (1946).
195 S. W. (2d) 504 (Mo. 1946).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss4/1
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retried without specific restrictions as to the issues to be retried leaves a
case for new trial on all issues. -The court pointed out that the failure of
plaintiff to appeal from the first judgment against one defendant rendered
that a final judgment as to that defendant and that the effect of the decision
on the first appeal was only to leave the case for trial against the other
defendant.
In general, the year's decisions in the field of appellate practice have
served to clarify at least two important questions under the new codethe rules respecting the filing of transcript on appeal, and the law with respect to the jurisdictional features of the notice of appeal. The general tendency of the decisions has been strongly in favor of the disposition of cases
upon their merits. It is worthy of note, also, that the court was not called
upon to consider any serious infractions of its rules in the preparation of
briefs.

CRIMINAL LAW
HOWARD B. LANG,

JR.*

During the year 1946 the Supreme Court of Missouri passed on twentyfour criminal appeals, affirming the trial courts in twenty and remanding
the remainder for new trial.
Cases of first impression in the field of criminal law and matters submitting entirely novel questions are unusual. This may be attributed largely
to the fact that in .both the fields of criminal procedure ,and substantive law
our statutory enactments .are practically all inclusive. Therefore, in most
of the cases passed on by the court and which will be discussed here the
principles announced simply affirm well established rules of law.
In only one case did the supreme court have before it a matter of first
impression in this state.' In another case a divided court passed on the
admissibility of a confession- obtained after more than twenty hours had
elapsed before the accused was taken before a magistrate.2
*Prosecuting Attorney, Boone County, Columbia. A.B., University of Missouri, 1934, LL.B. 1936, M.A. 1937.
1.. State v. Perkins, 198 S.- W. (2d) 704 (Mo. 1946). In this case for the
first time the. court had before it a voice recording of a confession.2. State v. Sanford, 354.Mo. 1012, 193 S. W. (2d) 35 (1946); State v. Ellis,
354 Mo. 998, 193 S. W. (2d) 31 (1946).
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PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL

A. Grand jury
A Negro defendant convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death contended on appeal that he had been denied equal protection of the law because of the fact that there were no Negroes on the grand
jury which had returned the indictment against him. The facts in the case
reveal that the grand jury was taken from a list of six hundred names
selected by eighteen circuit judges of the City of St. Louis, and that in-

cluded in the list were Negroes who were considered by the judges to be qualified. The court found that there was no evidence of discrimination in the
exercise of the discretion of the court in selecting the grand jury and that
the defendant was, therefore, not deprived of his constitutional rights.3
The court remarked, "It is only when the defendant is deprived by
design of the chance of having Negroes on the jury that the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution may be invoked."4
B. Appearance before magistrate
In two bitterly contested cases where the court handed down a majority
opinion, a concurring opinion and a dissenting opinion, the court had occasion to pass on the question of whether or not appearance before a magistrate (then justice of the peace) is mandatory as affecting any statement
made by the accused.5
In these two cases, both of which involved arrests by the Missouri
State Highway Patrol in a murder case, two sections of the Missouri Revised
Statutes, 1939, were brought into question. Section 8360, relating to the
Missouri State Highway Patrol, provides in essence that any person arrested
by a member of the patrol shall be forthwith taken before the magistrate
having jurisdiction of the crime. Section 4346 applies generally to all peace
officers and prohibits holding a person longer than twenty hours without
issuance of a warrant or other process."
3. State v. Ramsey, 197 S. W. (2d) 949 (Mo. 1946).
4. Id. at 952, citing State v. Logan, 341 Mo. 1164, 111 S. W. (2d) 110 (1937).
5. State v. Ellis, 354 Mo. 998, 193 S. W. (2d) 31 (1946); State v. Sanford,
354 Mo. 1012, 193 S. W. (2d) 35 (1946) (Concurring and dissenting opinions in
both cases, 354 Mo. 998, 193 S. W. (2d) 37).
6. "All persons arrested and confined in any jail, calaboose or other place
of confinement by any peace officer, without warrant or other process, for any
alleged breach of the peace or other criminal offense, or on suspicion thereof, shall
be discharged from said custody within twenty hours from the time of such' arrest,
unless they shall be charged with a criminal offense by the oath of some credible
person, and be held by warrant to answer to such offense;..."
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss4/1
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The court had before it the question of whether or not confessions which
were given after the twenty hour period were involuntary as a matter of
law, it being contended that the rights of defendants under the Fourteenth
Amendment were violated. These cases will be more fully discussed under
the section dealing with confessions. Suffice it to say at this point that the
majority of the court found that failure to take the defendant forthwith or
within twenty hours before a court or magistrate did not violate his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
II.

TRIAL

A. Right to counsel
In the case of Higgins v. Parker,Acting Warden,7 an inmate of the
penitentiary in an original habeas corpus proceeding attempted to obtain
his freedom on the ground that he did not have counsel at his trial. The
facts of the case were unique in that the accused at his trial was represented
by a layman masquerading as a lawyer on a forged certificate. However, for
the actual trial itself, a licensed attorney sat in the case and assisted in
the trial. The court recognized the right of an accused to competent counsel, but held that under these circumstances, even though one of the two
persons representing defendant was not a lawyer, the evidence would not
justify finding that he was without counsel during the trial.

B. Voir dire examination
The prosecuting attorney in one case in qualifying the jury panel on
voir dire examination made this statement: "Now, gentlemen, at the September term last year, in this case, a panel of jurors was quashed because
no colored persons were on it. . . ." A general objection was made by the
defense counsel and sustained by the court. The defense counsel then moved
unsuccessfully that the panel be discharged because of the statement made
by the prosecuting attorney. The court in sustaining the lower court reaffirmed the rule that discharging a jury for improper remarks during the
progress of the trial is a matter resting largely in the discretion of the court,
and further found that the objection was so general as to not be a valid
8
objection at all.
7. 354 Mo. 888; 191 S. W. (2d) 668 (1945).
8. State v. Smith, 194 S. W. (2d) 905 (Mo. 1946), quoting with approval
from State v. Raines, 333 Mo. 538, 62 S. W. (2d) 727 (1933).
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C. Continuance
The court held that the amendment of an information by striking out
the habitual criminal charge is not grounds for a continuance." In the
same case the court reaffirmed the well recognized rule that a defendant
who does not file an affidavit of surprise or request additional time to meet
the evidence of witnesses whose names are endorsed on the information at
the time of trial, cannot complain at the trial of the failure of the court
to grant a continuance.

0

D. Custody of defendant during trial
In the case of State v. Boone," the objection was made that the trial
court had erred in permitting the defendant to be shackled during the trial.
This is a practice which has long been prohibited except in exceptional cir2
cumstances.1
In the case before it, however, the court found that there was nothing
in the record showing that the defendant was handcuffed while in the presence of the jury and, therefore, found no error in this respect.
E. Separation of jury
The court again had before it the question of separation of jury in a
capital case. 3 The evidence in the case revealed that the jury was separated
at the close of the first day of trial because of inclement weather and after
discussion between the counsel for both the state and the defendant. The
defendant contended that even though there was an agreement with counsel,
still the separation could not be waived under the provisions of the Missouri statutes. 14 The court held that the defendant was not prejudiced by
the separation of the jury, and that the state's affidavits from the jurors that
they had not been prejudiced by the separation, were sufficient to overcome
the presumption of reversible error.
9. State v. Boone, 196 S. W. (2d) 794 (Mo. 1946).
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. State v. Rudolf, 187 Mo. 67, 85 S. W. 284 (1905); State v. Craft,
164 Mo. 631, 65 S. W. 280 (1901); State v. Rice, 347 Mo. 812, 149 S. W. (2d)
347 (1941); State v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591 (1877).
13. State v. Boone, supra note 9.
14. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 4071 provides in part: "With the consent of
the prosecuting attorney and the defendant, the court may permit the jury to
separate at any adjournment or recess of the court during the trial in all cases of
felony, except in capital cases; .
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss4/1
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Separation of the jury before they are impaneled and sworn was again
held to be within the discretion of the trial court.1 5
III. INSTRUCTIONS
The court in several instances had before it instructions involving the
law of self-defense. The defendant in one instance complained of an instruction which told the jury in the conjunctive that if they found the
defendant shot the deceased unnecessarily and when he did not have reasonable cause to believe that the deceased intended to kill or do great
bodily harm, then there was no self-defense and the defendant could not be
acquitted on that ground. Specific complaint was made of the use of the
word "unnecessarily."'' 6 The court in ruling against the defendant and
affirming the judgment found that the submission in the conjunctive with
the requirement of "reasonable cause to believe" and the use of the word
"necessary" in the instruction prevented the jury from being misledY..
In another case the supreme court reversed and remanded a conviction
because an instruction in an assault and battery case contained the unqualified clause "the law of self-defense does not imply the right of attack." The
court ruled properly that there are certain circumstances under which the
reasonable belief of an impending attack and immediate danger to one's
person will justify an attack in self-defense."'
Again in the case of State v. Foster"9 the court had before it a selfdefense instruction containing the clause "the defendant has interposed as a
defense what is known in law as the right of self-defense." The defendant
complained of the instruction, relying on a prior case which the court states
implied to the jury that the burden of proof rested on the defendant to establish self-defense. 20 The cases were distinguished by the court by holding
that the Foster case had simply told the jury that the appellant had interposed the "issue" of self-defense and did not thereby in any way shift the
burden of proof to the defendant.
The court also had before it the ever troublesome question of instructions on circumstantial evidence and reaffirmed the principle that an in15. State v. Spencer, 195 S. W. (2d) 99 (Mo. 1946).
16. State v. Eaton, 195 S. W. (2d) 457 (Mo. 1946).
17. See also State v. O'Leary, 44 S. W. (2d) 50 (Mo. 1931); State v.
Travlor, 339 Mo. 943, 98 S.W. (2d) 628 (1936); State v, Greeves, 243 Mo. 540,
147 S.W. 973 (1912).
18. State v. Daugherty, 196 S. W. (2d) 627 (Mo. 1946).
19. 197 S.W. (2d) 313 (Mo. 1946).
20. State v. Davis, 342 Mo. 594, 116 S.W. (2d) 110 (1938).
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struction on circumstantial evidence need not be given at all even on request, unless the evidence is wholly circumstantial. 2

IV.

EVIDENCE

A. Confessions and Admissions
The question of admissibility of a confession or admission by an accused,
as any prosecutor or defense lawyer knows, is one of the most important in
the field of criminal law. Very frequently the most important bit of evidence
in the case is the confession of the accused. The court in at least six cases
had before it the question of admissibility of a confession or an admission
against interest. In the companion cases of State v. Ellis= and State v.
Sanford"3 the court considered a very controversial question regarding the
admissibility of confessions obtained from the defendants where the law enforcement officials flagrantly violated the directives of the Missouri State
Highway Patrol Statute requiring persons arrested by the patrol to be taken
forthwith before a magistrate. The twenty hour rule was also violated. The
evidence showed that the defendants were moved from place to place and
were not brought before a proper committing magistrate for a considerable
time beyond the twenty hours, Ellis having been arrested on the 14th day
of December and taken before the magistrate on the 21st day of December.
A divided court, having handed down a majority opinion, a concurring opinion and a dissenting opinion, held that the defendants' confessions were admissible in evidence, notwithstanding the contention that they were involuntary as a matter of law because of the illegal detention of the defendants.
The court found that such illegal detention was not of such coercive force
as to bring about the confessions and thereby make them inadmissible. The
majority of the court held that the ultimate test of the confession should
be whether or not it was voluntary in fact, irrespective of the illegal detention. It is the opinion of the writer, a prosecuting attorney, that the majority
opinion of the court is correct. However, the able dissenting opinion of
Judge Tipton certainly will have a desired effect on the conduct of law enforcement officials as to the rights of a defendant in custody.
The court reaffirmed the rule that where a defendant objects to a confession on the ground that it was involuntary and requests a preliminary
examination, the request must be granted. However, in the case before
21.

State v. Foster, supra note 19.

22. 354 Mo. 998, 193 S. W. (2d) 31 (1946).
23. 354 Mo. 1012, 193 S. W. (2d) 37 (1946).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss4/1
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the court, the defendant was held to have waived the error by the trial
court in failing to hold such a preliminary examination in showing by his
24
own evidence that the confession was voluntary.
In a murder case, evidence of the conduct of the defendant in attempting to bribe a witness and an attempted subornation of perjury, was held
to be admissible against the defendant on the theory that his conduct showed
25
the defendant's cause to be an unrighteous one.
In the case of State v. Ramsey 26 a question and answer statement given
to an assistant prosecuting attorney in the presence of newspaper reporters
was held admissible in evidence. The defendant had contended that a prior
confession made to police officers after a thirteen-hour grilling was involuntary and that, therefore, any subsequent confession would also be inadmissible relying on the case of Aslcraft v. Teicessee.2 The court in an able
opinion distinguished the cases and held that where a confession has been
improperly obtained there is a rebuttable presumption that the second
confession was involuntary and that the state had successfully rebutted any
such presumption in introducing the second confession.
In the case of State v. Perkins28 the court was confronted with a novel
problem in a case of first impression in the State of Missouri. In that case
a death sentence for rape was affirmed and the court recognized the admissibility of a phonographic recording of a confession. Thus, the court placed
its stamp of approval upon the use of scientific developments which have
been made in the recording of the human voice and actions. In the opinion
the court quoted with approval from cases which had permitted the intloduction of sound movies of confessions. The use of sound movies and
phonograph recordings should prove very useful, particularly in determining
the voluntary character of a confession. In the case at bar, the defendant
had been informed that his statement was being recorded. However, the
court cited with approval a Pennsylvania case which held that the introduction of "Speak-o-phone" records secretly made of confessions of the
defendant, and the playing of the records in the presence of the jury, was
29
proper.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

State v. Smith, 354 Mo. 1088, 193 S. W. (2d) 499 (1946).
State v. Smith, 194 S. W. (2d) 905 (Mo. 1946).
197 S.W. (2d) 949 (Mo. 1946).
322 U. S.143, 64 Sup. Ct. 921 (1944).
198 S.W. (2d) 704 (Mo. 1946), noted (1947) 12 Mo. L. REV. 353.
Commonwealth v. Clark, 123 Pa. Super. 277, 187 Ad. 237 (1936).
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B. Acts and statements of co-conspirators
In a case before the court, three persons conspired together so that
the defendant in the case at bar could gain his freedom from jail where he
was being held pending trial. Two of the defendants took a machine gun
from the sheriff's home and upon being confronted by the sheriff murdered
him. The defendant in the case at bar was not present, but his conviction
and sentence, based on the testimony of the co-conspirators, were affirmed. 0
In this case the court reaffirmed the well accepted rule that a coconspirator is a competent witness as to a common design or conspiracy,
and the fact of the conspiracy can be proven by one of the co-conspirators.
The court also held that statements between the defendant's co-conspirators
is competent evidence as to the defendant, even though their statements
were made outside the presence or hearing of the defendant.
C. Presusmption
The court in two cases reaffirmed its long line of decisions holding that
the recent possession of stolen property is sufficient alone to submit the case
to the jury, although it does not constitute proof of guilt as a matter of
law. 31 In one of these cases the court held that the clause "recent possession"
would have to be determined on the facts of each case, and held that where
the property was found in the defendants' possession three months after it
was stolen, still the presumption that defendants stole the property was
available, the possession being "recent".
V. SECOND OFFENDERS
The court in recent years has been called upon more and more frequently
to pass on the conviction of second offenders under the so-called Habitual
32
Criminal Act.
Under the Habitual Criminal Act the state must plead and prove that
the defendant after conviction for a penitentiary offense has been discharged,
either upon pardon or upon compliance with the sentence, and convicted
of a second penitentiary offense after such pardon or discharge. In the case
of State v. Brinkleys3 the proof was that the defendant had been sentenced
for a graded felony to the St. Louis City Workhouse for five months, and
30. State v. Holloway, 195 S. W. (2d) 662 (Mo. 1946).
31. State v. Sheperd, 194 S. W. (2d) 908 (Mo. 1946); State v. Oliver, 195
S. W. (2d) 484 (Mo. 1946).

32. Mo. REv.
33.

STAT.

(1939) § 4854.

354 Mo. 1051, 193 S. W. (2d) 49 (1946).
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later paroled by the circuit court, and while still on parole committed a
homicide for which he was being tried under the Habitual Criminal Act.
The supreme court ruled that since the defendant was on parole at that time,
he was not within the provisions of the Habitual Criminal Act, because
he had not yet been discharged, either upon pardon or compliance with the
sentence.
The defendant in another case contended that the fact that he was
sentenced to five years imprisonment for first degree robbery under a charge
arising out of a case charging both robbery and the Habitual Criminal Act
was evidence of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. The court
reaffirmed its former position, holding that the jury could disbelieve the
evidence as to prior convictions and impose a lighter sentence in cases
charging violation of the Habitual Criminal Act, and held that such finding
by the jury was not evidence of passion or prejudice.3 4
The maximum punishment which can be assessed under the Habitual
Criminal Act is life imprisonment. The court held that in a first degree
murder case where punishment under the general statute is fixed at death
or life imprisonment, still the action could be prosecuted under the Habitual
Criminal Act and instructions could be given accordingly. The same case
held that a repetition of instructions as to punishment under the act in first
degree murder, second degree murder and manslaughter was proper, and
was not inflammatory as tending to emphasize prior convictions3 5
VI. RIGHT OF AN OFFICER IN EFFECTING AN ARREST
The supreme court had occasion to review fully and affirm its prior
rulings regarding the rights of an officer in effecting an arrest.36
In the case before the court a conviction for manslaughter in the killing
of a police officer who was attempting to make an arrest was affirmed. The
court ruled that an officer making an arrest without a warrant could do so
if he had reasonable grounds to suspect that a felony had been committed and
reasonable grounds to suspect that a person about to be arrested had committed the same. In the same case the court had before it the question of
the amount of force which can be used by an officer in effecting an arrest.
The court made this statement: "Officers need not engage felons on equal
terms. They are entitled to overcome flight or resistance with superior force,
34. State v. Sheperd, 194 S. W. (2d) 908 (Mo. 1946).
35. State v. Spencer, 195 S. W. (2d) 99 (Mo. 1946), supra note 15.
36. State v. Nolan, 354 Mo. 980, 192 S. W. (2d) 1016 (1946).
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to the extent of killing the felon if necessary".3 In the case before the court
the evidence was that the defendant had been guilty of burglary and larceny.
The court in permitting the use of deadly force by the officer was, of course,
passing on the situation before it, and the use of deadly force is always permitted because of the danger inherent in a burglary. However, the language
of the court is broader than the general rule. The test as to use of deadly
force in effecting an arrest is not simply that the offense for which the arrest
is contemplated is a felony. The only time that deadly force should be
permitted in an arrest is in a case where the crime for which the arrest is
sought to be made is one which normally threatens human life or limb. 88

EVIDENCE
JACKSON

A.

WRIGHT*

The decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri during 1946 on evidence
law are briefly noted herein. It is not the purpose to comment upon the
decisions, but to call attention to the points passed upon.
DiscoVERY
Probably the most important decision in this field during the year 1946
is in the case of State ex rel Thomzpson v. Harris." This deals with the provisions of the new Code of Civil Procedure pertaining to discovery of
evidence. In this case, an action in prohibition to prevent a circuit judge
from compelling the defendant in a civil damage suit to answer certain
interrogatories, the question of the scope of the interrogatories was presented.
The plaintiff in the damage suit filed interrogatories which in substance
asked the defendant railroad whether or not statements were taken from
certain witnesses, including the plaintiff, and if so, asked for the production
of the statements. The supreme court held that this went beyond the intent
of the code. The statements would not be competent or material evidence
for the plaintiff, for to him they would constitute hearsay. The new code 2
37. Id. at 1020.
38. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Vol. 1, § 131.
*Attorney, Mexico. B.S., University of Missouri, 1940, LL.B., 1944.
1. 195 S. W. (2d) 645 (Mo. 1946).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1946) § § 847.142, 847.86.
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does not authorize the production of documents either in court or on deposition or interrogatories which are incompetent and immaterial and not
germane to the subject matter of the suit. The section regarding interrogatories was intended to limit the scope to that of depositions. Since the
statements could not be ordered produced on depositions, they cannot be
ordered on interrogatories. The Missouri code differs in this respect from
the Federal Rules, which do not contain the test of admissibility at the
trial.
RELEVANCY, MATERIALITY AND COMPETENCY

In School Distriat of Clayton v. Kelsey, 3 the question was presented
of the introduction of an executory contract for the sale of land as evidence
pertaining to the value of adjacent land. This was a condemnation action
by a school district. The owner attempted to introduce in evidence a contract for the sale of land across the street from the condemned land as
evidence of the value of the land. The court held that executed sales in the
neighborhood would be competent evidence, but not contracts to sell. "There
is nothing to suggest that the sale contract, exhibit 5, was not bona fide in all
respects, but to permit such contracts to be offered, as sought here, would
open the door to contracts made in bad faith and with no intention of completion and consumation."'
The court again affirmed the rule that in a civil suit, evidence of the
conviction of the witness of violations of city ordinances is not admissible
to attack his credibility.5 Such convictions are not felonies or misdemeanors,
says the court. "Violation of a city ordinance is not a criminal offense but a
civil action to recover a debt or penalty due the city for the infraction of
its ordinances."
In State v. Foster,6 objection was made to the witness, an expert with
firearms, demonstrating to the jury the workings of a particular gun. The
court says that experiments in court are not forbidden when conducted under
proper judicial supervision and restraint, and allowed the demonstration.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
7
The court in two cases took judicial notice of facts outside the record.
In one, the court held that it would take judicial notice of the rise in city real
3. 196 S. W. (2d) 860 (Mo. 1946).
4. Id. at 863.
5. Stokes v. Wabash Ry., 197 S. W. (2d) 304 (Mo. 1946).
6. 197 S. W. (2d) 313 (Mo. 1946).
7. Kuhn v. Zepp, 196 S. W. (2d) 249 (Mo. 1946) and Holland v. Anderson,
196 S. W. (2d) 175 (Mo. 1946).
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estate values between 1937 and 1944, and in the other, of the maps of the
Missouri State Highway Commission showing the distance between towns
in Missouri.
WITNESSES

In Pickett v. Cooper," the court again was faced with the question of
a lay witness testifying with regard to witnesses' opinion of the sanity of a
testator. It re-affirms its stand that a lay witness may so testify if the witness
had sufficient opportunity to observe the testator, and bases his opinion on
related facts from which unsoundness of mind can reasonably be inferred.
Along the same line, in Beil v. Gaertner,9 the plaintiff brought suit in
the circuit court to set aside on the ground of fraud a judgement of the
probate court adjudging the plaintiff to be of unsound mind. The defendant
objected to the plaintiff's testimony on the ground that since the plaintiff
had been adjudged of unsound mind, she was incompetent to testify. The
court held it not to be error to allow plaintiff to testify, saying that the
adjudication of insanity created only a prima facie presumption of incompetency which is rebuttable by voir dire examination or otherwise.
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

The parol evidence rule was touched upon by the supreme court in
two cases. In IndustrialBank & Trust Company v. Hesselberg,10 which was
an action on a contract of guaranty, it was held that where the contract
was written and unambiguous prior parol negotiations could not be considered for the purpose of showing that the terms of the agreement were
different from those expressed in the written instrument. To do so, said the
court, would be in violation of the parol evidence rule. To the same effect
is the case of Chapman v. Breeze,:" which was an action for specific performance of a contract. The court held that the statements and actions of the
parties after the execution of the contract could be shown to prove waiver
of contract provisions, but that prior actions and conversation could not
be introduced.
EXPERTS

case,' 2

In a criminal
the state called as an expert witness a police
sergeant from the St. Louis police force. The defendant objected to his
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

354 Mo. 910, 192 S. W. (2d) 412 (1946).
197 S. W. (2d) 611 (Mo. 1946).
195 S. W. (2d) 470 (Mo. 1946).
198 S. W. (2d) 717 (Mo. 1946).
State v. Foster, 197 S. W. (2d) 313 (Mo. 1946).
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qualifications. He had been gunsmith and shooting instructor for the force
for nine years, and had worked on about thirty guns each year, including
twelve of the type in question. The supreme court held him qualified, again
defining the requisites of an expert witness. "An expert need not be a
technical scientist or college graduate to qualify as such. If he possesses
adequate special knowledge regarding the subject matter to which his
testimony relates, and has the capacity to draw relevant inferences therefrom he is qualified although his knowledge was drawn from study, observa3
tion or practical experience.'
An interesting question was presented in Zesck v. Abrasive Co. of
4
This was an action based upon the exploding or breaking up
Philadelphia.1
of an abrasive wheel. Negligence of the defendant was alleged in failure to
test the wheel properly. On direct examination, the plaintiff's expert witness
referred to the "American Standard Safety Code for the Use, Care and
Protection of Abrasive Wheels." He referred to it again on cross examination
as containing the standards that are set up for testing. On direct examination
of defendant's witnesses, defendant's counsel premised his questions on
provisions of the code, and elicited testimony that the wheel in question was
properly tested. The plaintiff contended on appeal that this permitted the
code to be used as independent evidence, and thus error. The safety code
was not introduced in evidence. The court did not definitely rule upon the
use, stating that it seemed to be a case of first impression. The court, apparently basing the decision on the prior reference by plaintiff's witness, merely
states, "We believe it was not error, on the contrary it would seem fair, in
such a situation, to permit defendant's witnesses to testify of defendant's
compliance with the provisions of the code."
ADMISSIONS

In a suit for commissions, the plaintiff in McKelly v. Metco Products,
15
Inc., contended that his contract of employment called for commission
payments, as against the contention of the defendant company that he was
on a salary basis. The plaintiff was originally employed by another company,
and the defendant company was organized as a separate company in April.
New books were not set up for the new company until July. All activity of
the new company from April till September was carried on through the
books of the old company, but in September, an accounting was had, and
13. Id. at 325.
14. 354 Mo. 1147, 193 S. W. (2d) 581 (1946).
15. 354 Mo. 933, 193 S. W. (2d) 28 (1946).
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the books of the new company adjusted. When this was done, the payments
to the plaintiff, which were shown as "commissions" on the old books were
shown as "salary" on the new ones. The defendant offered the new books in
evidence apparently in the nature of a contemporaneous entry. Plaintiff
objected on the grounds that they had nothing to do with payments to the
plaintiff; that they were self serving; and that they were not binding on
the plaintiff. The court held: "Book entries not made contemporaneously, or
nearly so, with the transaction recorded are not part of the res gestae and
are not admissible." The court goes on to say that they were not in the
nature of contemporaneous entries, and as such were not good, but that
it was not a material error, and that no objection was made by the plaintiff
that they were not the original book entries. "Competency of evidence will
generally be determined by the objection made."1o
In State v. Smitk, 17 a prosecution for murder, evidence was introduced
to the effect that the defendant had attempted to bribe a witness, and to
pay her money to leave the state. The defendant strenuously objected. The
court held such evidence admissible as an admission. Citing State v.
Mathews"8 and Fidkerson v. Murdock, 9 the court states, "Evidence to show
that an accused has attempted to fabricate or procure false evidence or
destroy evidence against him is always admissible as showing consciousness
of guilt. ...Evidence of the fact of an attempted subornation is admissible
as an admission by conduct that the party's cause is an unrighteous one.'"2.
The fact that a bribery charge was pending at the time did not change this
rule.
HEARSAY

The court followed a well established rule in Wilson v. Kansas City
Public Service Co.,21 by holding that testimony as to the average earnings
of laundry deliverymen based only on what witness had heard from others
or what he had seen on route sheets, was hearsay.
CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS

In a larceny case, 22 a note written by the defendant to his wife was
held to be properly admitted in evidence. The note was written by the
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 30.
194 S. W. (2d) 905 (Mo. 1946).
202 Mo. 143, 100 S. W. 420 (1907).
53 Mo. App. 151 (1893).
State v. Smith, 194 S.W. (2d) 905, 907 (Mo. 1946).
354 Mo. 1032, 193 S. W. (2d) 5 (1946).
State v. Smith, 354 Mo. 1088, 193 S.W. (2d) 499 (1946).
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defendant, then read by an officer with defendant's permission. This, said
the court, took it out of the class of confidential communications, and especially in this case where no objection was made to its admission, it was not
error to admit it.
PRESUMPTIONS

The court, following a familiar rule, in Donnelly Garment Co. v. Kettel,2
found a claimant in an unemployment compensation case, who was shown
to have refused suitable work during one week, to have continued to be
"unavailable" and not entitled to benefits until the contrary is shown.
Stating the rule, the court says, "A general rule of presumption is that,
where the existence at one time of a certain condition or state of things of a
continuing nature is shown, the presumption arises that such condition or
24
state continues to exist until the contrary is shown.1

THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
WLLIAMA

H.

BECKER, JR.*

In 1946 the supreme court did not deal with any case of great importance in the development of the humanitarian doctrine. During the year the
court en bane did not hand down a decision involving the doctrine. All decisions rendered during 1946 appeared to deal with the doctrine as a true
negligence or fault rule. In only one case, Marczuk v. St. Louis Public Serv-

ice Co.,' was there any evidence of application of the doctrine to a new fact
situation. In this case judge Tipton wrote an opinion, clear and short, holding that a plaintiff may, under proper circumstances, make a case of obliviousness to peril from an approaching vehicle, even though he has seen and
is aware of the approach of the vehicle. Logically the opinion is acceptable.
An attempt to recover upon the doctrine in a case of a unique factory
accident failed, not because of the inherent inapplicability of the doctrine to
novel fact situations, but because of the lack of proof of notice of the peril of
2
the injured party.
23. 354 Mo. 1138, 193 S. W. (2d) 577 (1946).
24. Id. at 581.
*Attorney, Columbia, LL.B., University of Missouri, 1932.
1. 196 S. W. (2d) 1000 (Mo. 1946).
2. Kobusch v. Ruberoid Co., 194 S. W. (2d) 911 (Mo. 1946).
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The most significant ruling of 1946 was the decision in Lowry v. Mohn.3
In this opinion, written by Commissioner VanOsdol, the court held one second was too short a time within which to avert an imminent intersectional
automobile collision by any means, including warning. This may be the beginning of a departure from the earlier decisions submitting failure to warn
where the peril is discovered or discoverable only a second before the injury.
There was a notable lack of decisions dealing with instructions, usually
the most prolific source of assignments of error in appeals involving the doctrine. Speculation suggests that this lack is attributable to the decline in
litigation during wartime and to the statute, now replaced, requiring specific objections to instructions at the trial.
Division Nwrber 1
In Wilson v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,4 a streetcar struck a laun-

dry truck driver who was standing beside his parked truck looking inside for
a bundle. The questions touching humanitarian negligence and practice decided by the court are not notable.
Wrigkt v. Spieldo, involved the striking of a pedestrian, standing in a
street, by defendant's automobile. The case was submitted to the jury upon
primary negligence in driving at an excessive rate of speed, and upon humanitarian negligence in failing to warn and to swerve. In sustaining this submision of the cause, the court ruled 'that the assignment of excessive speed
was neither legally nor factually inconsistent with the assignment of humanitarian negligence in failing to swerve.
In Lowry v. Mokn,6 the court dealt with a collision of two automobiles
colliding in the center of a right angle road crossing. In a lucid opinion, the
court applied the humanitarian doctrine as a rule based on fault and actual
negligence, and finds that the time intervening between the plaintiff's apparent imminent peril and the collision was so short that preventive action on
the part of the defendant could not reasonably be expected, therefore the
cause was not submissible to the jury on humanitarian negligence. The time
involved was approximately one second. This case might be interpreted as
3.
4.
5.
6.

195 S. W. (2d) 652 (Mo. 1946).
354 Mo. 1032, 193 S. W. (2d) 5 (1946).
354 Mo. 1076, 193 S. W. (2d) 42 (1946).
Supra note 3.
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evidence of a tendency to retreat from earlier opinions submitting failure to
warn under the humanitarian rule in split second time situations.
This case came near to presenting the long awaited automobile intersectional collision wherein two oblivious operators collide with ample time
for either to avoid the collision; but the time element was too short. Its
disposition by the court is undoubtedly sound. It will be interesting to see
if the same result will be reached in a case based upon failure to warn in a
train-auto collision.
Division Number 2
In Kobusck v. Ruberoid Co., 7 the plaintiff sought to extend the humanitarian doctrine to a situation where a painter was killed by a moving overhead
electric crane in a factory. The evidence showed that the crane operator
had no actual knowledge of the presence of the deceased on or about the
crane tracts until after the casulty. When struck the deceased was crossing
the crane track to go below for a special paint brush needed to paint a beam
near the ceiling. The crane operator had seen painters near the tracks before, but was unaware of the painting operations on the day in question. The
court, in holding that no submissible case was made, did not deny the applicability of the humanitarian doctrine to an intramural factory casualty.
It did, however, find an essential element missing in plaintiff's case, namely,
constructive notice of the plaintiff's peril. In refusing to charge the crane
operator with a duty to lookout for the painter, the court said:
"We have ruled that sporadic use of a place does not constitute such user of the place as to invoke the extended humanitarian rule as to discoverable peril."8
The decision is one clearly recognizing the doctrine as one based upon
human fault.
In Marczuk v. St. Louis Public Service Co.,9 the court rendered an opinion of considerable interest, distinguishing between' awareness of approach of
a vehicle and awareness of the danger created by the approach in a case submitted upon failure to warn under the humanitarian doctrine. In this case
a streetcar struck a pedestrian who was crossing the car tracks at a street
intersection in St. Louis. The evidence showed that the pedestrian had seen
the approaching car shortly before he was struck, but had looked away from
7. 194 S. W. (2d) 911 (Mo. 1946).
8. Id. at 915.
9. 196 S. W. (2d) 1000 (Mo. 1946).
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the car thereafter and proceeded at a run to cross in front of the car. Acknowledging the general rule that there is no duty to warn under the humanitarian doctrine unless the plaintiff is oblivious, the court nevertheless
held that one who knows of the approach of a vehicle on a collision course,
but who, apparently and actually, is unaware of the danger of imminent collision is entitled to a warning under the humanitarian doctrine. In so holding the court said:
"That there was a duty on the appellant to keep a lookout is
not even disputed. Crews v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,
supra. It is only claimed that he was not entitled to a warning bell
because he was aware of the approach of the car but, as we have
just pointed out, there was evidence from which the jury could
find that he came into a position of imminent peril and was oblivious, in the sense of unawareness of danger, after and even though
he once saw the car and was or should have been aware of its approach. McGowan v. Wells, supra. Under these circumstances,
there being evidence of obliviousness, he was entitled to a warning,
which he claimed he did not receive."1 °
This decision is logically sound, at least in a case where, as in the Marczuk case, the operator of the vehicle is actually aware of the pedestrian's
peril and lack of appreciation of his danger. A harder question would be
presented if the motorman in the Marczuk case had also been oblivious of
the imminent collision.
In Stokes v. Wabask Railroad Co.,1 defendant's locomotive struck the
plaintiff pedestrian at a public crossing at night. The case was submitted
solely upon the humanitarian doctrine upon the theory that the plaintiff was
in the path of the approaching locomotive and oblivious of his danger, discoverable by the fireman and engineer. The plaintiff testified that he looked
in the direction of the approaching locomotive before venturing on the
tracks, but did not see it. His attention was distracted as the locomotive
bore down on him. Under the circumstances the court held that "to look is
no conclusive evidence of seeing, but merely circumstantial evidence of seeing," raising a jury question on the issue of obliviousness. Comparing this

case with Marczuk v. St. Louis Public Service Company,1 2 we may conclude
that even an admission of seeing the approaching vehicle would not destroy
10. Id. at 1003.
11. 197 S. W. (2d) 304 (Mo. 1946).
12. Supra note 9.
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plaintiff's case of obliviousness to the peril; according to these cases the determinative issue on the question of obliviousness is not the plaintiff's seeing
the vehicle but his knowledge and appreciation of his peril. The close questions decided in the Stokes case and the Marcz-ak case do not involve the
logic or basis of the humanitarian doctrine, but involve the power of the
court to direct a verdict. This technical question is not always insignificant
but sometimes is crucial as far as result is concerned.

INSURANCE
ROBERT

E.

SEILER*

Three of the 1946 insurance decisions involve coverage questions.1
In the Helm case, 2 the policy clause involved was the one excluding coverage
to drivers under 16 years of age and the question was whether such a driver
who misrepresented his age was entitled to the benefits of the policy where
his true age was not discovered until the trial of the damage suit against

him was actually under way. Tom Helm, driving his father's car with the
latter's permission, had an accident, slightly injuring several high school
companions. When the accident was promptly investigated by the attorneys
for the insurer, young Helm stated in writing that he was 16 years old and
would be 17 at a certain date (this was false; he was actually only 15).
Subsequently, one of the girls in the car, along with her parents, sued young
Helm for personal injuries. During the voir dire examination at the trial of
the girl's case, her counsel brought out from young Helm and his father
that Helm was at the time of the trial 17 years of age, which meant he was
under 16 at the time of the accident. This fact was confirmed by the attorneys
for the insurer during the noon recess, by reference to official records, and
the insurance attorneys then withdrew from further defense of the -girl's
case and also the parents' case, by leave of court and in such manner that
the insurance company was not estopped to deny liability. The trial of the
*Attorney, Joplin. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1935.

1. Helm v. Inter-Insurance Exchange for Automobile Club of Missouri, 354
Mo. 935, 192 S. W. (2d) 417 (1946); Corder v. Morgan Roofing Co., 350 Mo.
382, 195 S. W. (2d) 441 (1946); Loudenslager v. Gorum, 195 S. W. (2d) 498 (Mo.
1946), cert. del. 67 Sup. Ct. 1301 (1946); Rehearing den. 67 Sup Ct. 1528 (1947).
2. Helm v. Inter-Insurance Exchange for Automobile Club of Missouri, 354

Mo. 935, 192 S. W. (2d) 417 (1946).
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gfrl's case then proceeded with other attorneys representing young Helm
and resulted in a $2,000 judgment.
Instead of the girl's counsel attempting to garnishee the insurance
company on the judgment, they brought suit for young Helm against the
insurance company for damages for the withdrawal of the attorneys from
the defense of the original damage suit. They obtained a judgment in the
trial court for $5,092.00, which was reversed and remanded by the Springfield Court of Appeals, and reversed outright by the supreme court, en banc.
Plaintiff attempted to establish a tort liability against the insured,
claiming that having once assumed defense and control of the original
damage suit, the insured could not withdraw at a "critical" time when serious
damage might thereupon result to plaintiff.
In a concise, well-written opinion, Judge Tipton ruled that no tort arose
from the insurance company's refusal to continue with the defense of the
original damage suit, since young Helm was only 15 years old at the time
of the accident, and hence the insurance company was under no obligation to
defend. In fact, the court points out that after the question of Helm's correct
age was raised on voir dire and then confirmed by investigation during the
noon recess (the insurance attorneys having been entitled to rely on Helm's
original statement that he was 16 years old) it would have been unprofessional conduct for the insurance attorneys to have continued with the defense
of the original damage suit.
The Corder case 3 involved garnishments against the insurance company
to collect personal injury judgments. The original public liability policy
(limits $5,000/$10,000) issued to the defendant covered claims for injuries
or death to persons not employees "while within or upon the premises described in Special Condition 4 (or upon the sidewalks or other ways immediately adjacent thereto)." The policy excluded injuries caused by vehicles
used elsewhere than upon the premises described in Special Condition 4.
However, Special Condition 4 described the places where "such trade or
business is conducted" as "623 Joplin St., Joplin, Missouri, and elsewhere
in the State of Missouri." The business of the defendant was building roofs,
mostly in southwest Missouri, but it also bid on some PWA contracts and
was awarded 15 to 20 in central and north Missouri. The PWA had an
insurance requirement requiring broad coverage for "claims for damages
3. Corder v. Morgan Roofing Co., 350 Mo. 382, 195 S. W. (2d) 441 (1946).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss4/1
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for personal injury, accidental death and to property" up to $10,000 for
one person and $20,000 for one accident. Through the same agent and
channels as used in writing the original policy, defendant obtained certificates
from the insurance company showing compliance with the PWA requirement, including a certificate on a sub-contract roofing job at Marshall, Missouri, stating "complete coverage within the limits stated for the type of
insurance mentioned, covering all of the assured's operations in connection
with the assured's contract on PWA Docket No. 5131-L-2." This certificate
showed Marshall, Missouri, as the place where the work was to be done
and public liability coverage of $10,000/$20,000 and property damage coverage of $5,000. The plaintiffs were injured in a collision on U. S. Highway 66
between their automobile and a vehicle operated by an employee of defendant. The husband and wife obtained judgments of $3,832.75 and $10,000.00,
respectively, the wife's judgment being affirmed on appeal by the supreme
court. The insurance company refused to defend, on the ground that its
policy did not cover liability for damages done by a vehicle on a public
highway.
The court holds that the certificate became part of the insurance
contract, pointing out its purpose plainly was to broaden the coverage to
comply with PWA requirements, and also that later the company audited
defendant's payrolls and collected a substantial premium. The language of
the policy in Special Condition 4 "623 Joplin St., Joplin, Missouri, and
elsewhere in the State of Missouri" was held to be at least ambiguous as to
what places were meant to be covered and the court construed the policy
and the certificate to cover all operations in the state in connection with
work on the Marshall job.
But the court refused to allow recovery of damages and attorney's fees
by the judgment creditors, saying this could be done only by a policyholder
in a suit on the policy. The insurer was guilty of vexatious delay here, but
escaped without penalty.
The other coverage case was Loudenslager v. GorUm,4 where Louden-

slager's widow and daughter obtained a death award from the Missouri
Workmen's Compensation Commission for his death. The accident happened
in Arkansas. The contract of employment was made in Missouri. In a prior
compensation hearing in Arkansas, after an attempted dismissal by the
4. 195 S. W. (2d) 498 (Mo. 1946), cert den. 67 Sup. Ct. 1301 (1946), rehear-

ing den. 67 Sup. Ct. 1528 (1947).
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claimants, the Arkansas Workmen's Compensation Commission denied the
claim, on the ground that deceased was not an employee but was an independent contractor. No appeal was taken from the Arkansas decision, but the
Missouri court held this was no bar to a subsequent claim in Missouri. One
of the defenses to the Missouri claim was that the insurer insured the
employer only under the Arkansas Act and not under the Missouri Act.
Gorum, the employery had a trucking business, operating in Missouri,
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The deceased drove his own truck in
Gorum's service. The insurance company issued the insurance by writing the
following letter (date not shown):
"Dear Mr. Gorum: The National Mutual Casualty Company
is hereby bound and agrees to pay any loss created or occurring
to the Arkansas Traveler Truck Line, of Bentonville, Arkansas,
from April 16, 1941, to June 25, 1941. This binder covers the
Arkansas Traveler Truck Line the same as if their Workmen's
Compensation Policy had been issued. Nathan C. Agnet, General
Agent."
Later the insurance company issued Gorum a general public liability
and property damage policy covering his operations everywhere. This policy
had an endorsement making it cover Arkansas Compensation Act liability,
but the foregoing letter binder was not referred to. The death occurred June
18, 1941. The court held that on this record there was substantial support
for the finding of the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission that
the insurance company was the insurer as to Missouri liability, even though
the insurer had never qualified in Missouri.
Unfortunately, the decision does not show the date of the liability
policy, but assuming that it was issued prior to the date of death the court
seems to be straining a point in stating that the endorsement covering the
Arkansas Compensation liability did not serve to limit the broad language
of the binder letter. Under the binder, Arkansas Compensation Act liability
was already covered, so if the endorsement did not serve to limit the coverage
of the binder, the parties were deliberately doing a needless act in issuing
and accepting the endorsement.
In some ways the Laustrupr case is a difficult case. Here, the company
issued a $5,000 life policy with quarterly premiums of $57.00 due on or
before the 20th of September, December, March and June. Ringe, the insured,
5. Laustrup v. Bankers Life Co., 196 S. W. (2d) 260 (Mo. 1946).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss4/1
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died on April 8, 1932. He paid the quarterly premium through September
20, 1931. The policy contained a 31-day grace period. On January 20, 1932,
Ringe obtained an extension to February 20, 1932, for the payment of
premiums due December 20, 1931, paying $5.00 for the extension (computed
$1.00 per $1000), which extension, however, did not provide any additional
days of grace.
On March 8, 1932, defendant wrote Ringe, stating the amount due to be
$52.26, calling attention to the expiration of the premium extension, pointing
out that the policy had lapsed because of non-payment and suggesting that
Ringe apply for reinstatement. Ringe replied to the effect that he didn't
have the money and if the company would carry him to September, 1932,
he might be able to pay up the premium. On March 19, 1932, the defendant
replied, saying it would not be necessary to pay the premium in full at that
time and that they would consider the reinstatement if he would fill out the
enclosed reinstatement forms and send in $35.00 Ringe made no reply and
took no action. On April 5, 1932, the defendant mailed Ringe a notice of
premium due March 20, 1932. Defendant's policy record card carried the
following pencil notation "lapsed March 1932."
Plaintiff recovered judgment in the trial court and on appeal urged
first that since the policy provided that "no payment shall continue the policy in force beyond the date when the next payment is due, except as hereinafter provided," that the $5.00 payment for the extension carried the policy
until the date when the next premium was due (March 20, 1932) plus days
of grace ending April 21, 1932. However, the court held that the language
of the policy clearly meant that only the premium payment (in this case
$57.00) would continue the policy until the next premium date.
Plaintiff next urged that defendant had waived the forfeiture by leading
Ringe to believe it waived the terms of the extension agreement and treated
the December premium as having been paid by extending credit in lieu of
cash; also that the claim of forfeiture was inconsistent with (1) applying
$5.00 cash as payment of the December premium; (2) charging interest on
the balance of the December premium to March 20; (3) sending notice of
premium due March 20 and advising of days of grace, and (4) marking its
policy card "lapsed March 1932."
The court said the mailing of the premium notice on April 5 and the
marking of the policy card "lapsed March 1932" were inconsistent with the
prior letters of defendant that the policy had lapsed on February 20. But
the court held the March 8 letter clearly stated the policy had -lapsed and
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merely offered to reinstate upon certain conditions, which Ringe did not
accept. As to the marking of the policy card "lapsed March 1932," the
court held there was no evidence that Ringe knew of this and it could not
have induced him to believe the policy was still in force.
As to the mailing of the March premium notice the court pointed out
this was done after the policy had lapsed according to its terms and the
assured had been so informed and this did not have the effect of reviving or
reinstating the lapsed policy. In other words, mere inconsistent action by
the company is not alone enough to reinstate or waive the forfeiture.
The Shay case6 was an assignee's action to recover for total and permanent disability under an insurance policy, but the case turns on the defense that the issue of whether the insured was totally and permanently
disabled was res adjudicata as the result of a prior action in federal court.
In Asel v. Order of United Comomercial Travelers,7 the supreme court
en banc had before it an action brought against a fraternal beneficiary association, an Ohio corporation, on an accidental injury policy. One of the
provisions of the constitution of the defendant (made a part of the policy)
required that any suit on the policy must be brought within six months after
the claim had been disallowed by the Order. However, the plaintiff did
not bring the action until 13 months after the claim had been disallowed
and this fact was pleaded in bar. The court ruled that the policy was an
Ohio contract, but nevertheless held that under Section 3351, Mo. Rev.
Stat., 1939, the limitation period set forth in the policy was not binding in
Missouri as a matter of public policy and instead the five year statute of
limitations applied, so that the limitation provision of the policy was not
a bar to the action. Then the court went on to give another reason for
its decision, namely, that the insurer's constitution had been amended anyway and acknowledged that the five year Missouri statute9 applied to actions
on the policy in Missouri.

6. Shay v. New York Life Ins. Co., 354 Mo. 920, 192 S.W. (2d) 421 (1946).
7. 197 S. W. (2d) 639 (Mo. 1946).
8. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 6147.
9. Ibid.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss4/1
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PROPERTY
WILLARD L. ECKHARDT*

No attempt has been made to brief and discuss all of the 1946 Missouri
property cases decided by the supreme court 1 Many of the cases apply
well-established principles of property law, and the issues are primarily
issues of pleading or proof. Most of the cases discussed have been selected
for one of three reasons: first, because they are cases of first impression in
Missouri; second, because they overrule or modify, in important respects,
earlier Missouri decisions; and third, because dicta seem to be of dubious
soundness. No actual holding of doubtful soundness was found.
DELIVERY OF DEEDS
2

In Weigel v. Wood, a suit to quiet title to land, the plaintiff attacked
a certain deed in the chain of title on the ground that it had neither been
delivered by the grantor nor accepted by the grantee. By way of dictum
the court considers a case where the grantor records the deed. The court
recognizes the well-established doctrine that recording a deed does not of
itself operate as a delivery of the deed.3 The court then says that "the
recording of a deed will not of itself constitute a delivery to the grantee
in the absence of an acceptance by him of the instrument. . . . It is fundamental that acceptance of a deed is necessary to its validity. ... There are
no hard and fast rules as to what constitutes sufficient acceptance. Acceptance may be shown by the acts and conduct of the grantee." The court held
that a later conveyance by the grantee constituted acceptance. The court's
statement as to acceptance probably was not intended to require an affirma*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. B.S., University of Illinois, 1935,
LL.B., 1937; Sterling Fellow, Yale University, 1937-1938.
1. See GILL, 1947 Pocket Part to 1946 Annotated Supplement, Missouni
TrrLEs (3d ed. 1931) for references to the following: Missouri Supreme Court cases
not included in the scope of the present study; Missouri Supreme Court rules; Missouri Court of Appeals cases; Misouri statutes; and Federal cases, statutes and
regulations.
2. 194 S.W. (2d) 40 (Mo. 1946).
3. The public record of the value of documentary stamps affixed to a deed
discloses the sale price of the land. The doctrine that the recording of a deed does
not of itself operate as a delivery of the deed has an interesting application in one
technique used to avoid such disclosure. "The tax accrues at the time the deed
or other instrument of conveyance is delivered. . . ." Code of Fed. Reg. (Cum.
Supp. 1944) Title 26, § 113.80. Thus the grantor may record an undelivered deed,
then affix and cancel the documentary stamps, and deliver the deed to the grantee.
KEATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW (1946) 48-9. The writer of this article does not
recommend this device, in view of certain practical difficulties which may arise
therefrom.
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tive act of acceptance in every case, inasmuch as one of the cases cited in
this opinion recognizes the much broader doctrine that where the grant is
beneficial to the grantee, an acceptance will be presumed in the absence of
any evidence showing a rejection of the grant 4
Potts v. PattersonPwas an action in partition by a pretermitted heir,
a grandson of the decedent, against a daughter of the decedent. The decedent
and his wife had made a warranty deed in favor of his daughter. It was
placed in an envelope, sealed, and handed to a bank cashier, who pursuant
to instructions from and in the presence of the decedent, wrote on the
envelope: "The enclosed deeds from William F. Potts and Rachel S. Potts
made to Goldie Rachel Patterson, and one to Uphema Ann Sommers, is to
be held in excrow at the Home Bank, Savannah, Missouri, until the makers
have passed away, then to be delivered to Goldie Rachel Patterson, and
Uphema Ann Sommers. October 15th, 1941." The envelope was placed in
a lock box belonging to the bank. A week later the decedent executed his
will which was placed in his own lock box in the bank. Two years later he
told the bank cashier he wanted to take his papers home and look them
over; the cashier gave the decedent his will and the sealed envelope. The
decedent died a month later, and his widow returned the sealed envelope
to the bank. The plaintiff contends that because the grantor had the deed
in his possession at the time of his death, he had not parted with all
dominion and control over it so as to make a valid delivery; and consequently the grantee took nothing under the deed, and the land was part
of the decedent's estate. The court found that the decedent delivered the
deeds to the cashier with unconditional instructions to hold them in escrow
for the grantees, and that he had reserved no dominion or control over
them. Under Missouri decisions this satisfied the delivery requirement and
conveyed to the grantee a present interest (future as to possession) in the
land., An analysis of certain parts of the will confirmed this view of the
delivery in escrow.

4. Clark v. Skinner, 334 Mo. 1190, 70 S.W. (2d) 1094 (1934). One of the
leading cases is Mitchell v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377 (1854), holding that a conveyance
by a father to a minor daughter was effective where the father recorded the deed,
even though the grantee had no knowledge of the transaction during her lifetime.
5. 195 S. W. (2d) 454 (Mo. 1946).
6. See generally, McCleary, Some Problems Involved in Conditional Deliveries of Deeds (1931), 43 LAw SERIES, U. oF Mo. BUL. 5.
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BOUNDARIES
7

Huff main v. Benitez was an action to quiet title and in ejectment. Defendant claimed under admeasurement of dower by commissioners whose
report was as follows: "That the said widow shall have as her dower the
Northwest 40 acres of said tract of land, the same being the Northwest
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23 . . . including the buildings ... ; the said tract of 40 acres ... being surrounded.., on the East by
Highway 63 ... " The plaintiff purchased at an executor's sale "All of the
Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23." [For convenience these tracts will be referred to as the northwest quarter section and
the northeast quarter section, respectively.] The quarter section line ran
through the residence; the highway was thirty to forty feet east of the
quarter section line, and there was an area of six acres between the quarter
section line and the west line of the highway. The controversy was over
this six acre tract on the west side of the northeast quarter section. The question was whether the east boundary of the land admeasured to the widow as
dower was the quarter section line, which would give the widow forty acres,
but would give her use of only part of the residence and would deny her
direct access to the highway, or whether the east line was the highway, which
would give the widow forty-six acres (forty in the northwest quarter section
and six in the northeast quarter section), use of all of the residence, and
direct access to the highway. The court held that the highway as a monument controlled over the conflicting elements in the description of acreage
and government monuments, in ascertaining the intention of the commissioners taking their report as a whole.
A unique and baffling problem in determining a boundary from descriptions contained in three deeds was presented in Hart v. Wright Lumber Co.8
Only the first deed will be noticed here. This deed described the east line
of a tract as "running in an Easterly direction with the meanderings of
said river in such, a way that said line shall at all times be ten (10) feet
North [east] of the said river at all times equally distant therefrom . . ."
(italics added). The defendant argued that this deed conveyed a strip of
land which, notwithstanding and to whatever extent erosion changed the line
of the river bank subsequent to the conveyance, would nonetheless continue
to extend ten feet in width from the river's bank. Although the court

7. 196 S. W. (2d) 856 (Mo. 1946).
8. 196 S. W. (2d) 272 (Mo. 1946).
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conceded that the west (river) boundary might be changed by accretion,
erosion, and reliction, the court held that the east boundary was a fixed line
which would not change. No authorities are cited, except Tiffany to the effect
that land has a fixed location and is immovable." The court says: "With
the distinguishing characteristic of land, its immovability or fixity of location, in mind, it is plainly seen the description of the east line of the tract
of land conveyed by the deed of Doniphan Lumber Company as running
'at all times' ten feet north (east) of the river bank was the delineation of
a boundary-a line indicating the limit of furthest extent of the tract conveyed." It is not clear whether on the one hand the court's conclusion is
based on the intent of the parties determined by interpreting the description
or by construing the description, or whether on the other hand the court is
holding that as a matter of law, even though intention is clear, the parties
cannot provide for a shifting boundary. If the latter is the court's view, the
rule has advantages from the point of view of certainty. On the other hand
there may be situations where there is practical need for permitting a shifting boundary where the opposite boundary admittedly shifts. For example,
A conveys to B a ten foot right-of-way along a river bank. Does B lose his
easement if erosion cuts away the original ten foot strip? If the right-of-way
is a public road, of course another right-of-way can be condemned, and a
third and a fourth, but should this be required? Is it more difficult to conceive of a shifting boundary on the land side than on the river side of a tract
of land? An aside by the court with reference to the two later deeds may
indicate that the court was blazing its own trail toward a solution of the
problem indicated above. 10
STATUTE OF FRAUDs

Plassard1

In State v.
the defendant was convicted of feloniously exhibiting a deadly weapon. On appeal the supreme court held that the trial
court erred in excluding evidence offered to establish that defendant was
rightfully in possession of certain farm land where the incident occurred,
and consequently had a constitutional right to bear arms in the defense
of his home and property. Defendant offered to prove that his sister-in-law,
a widow owning a life estate in the land, had orally leased the land to him
9. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. by Jones, 1939) § 1.
10. "The parties, plaintiffs and defendant, seem untroubled by any possible
distinction between the terms 'water's edge' and 'bank of Current River.'" Supra
n. 8, at p. 275.
11. 195 S. W. (2d) 495 (Mo. 1946).
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for her life. The court cites Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939) § 3352, declaring that
an oral lease has the effect of a lease at will only. Establishing a tenancy
at will would be sufficient as a basis for the claimed defense.' 2 By way of
dictum the court says further: "The life tenant could make a binding oral
agreement for the occupancy of the home place. In See v. See, Mo. Sup.,
237 S. W. 795 [1922], the court held that an oral contract with the life
tenant for the rental of a farm was not within the Statute of Frauds, because
it could be performed within a year." The statement in See v. See referred
to is as follows: "Appellant claims the original oral contract was within the
statute of frauds and therefore is no defense. There are many reasons why
this point is not well taken, one or two of which may be mentioned. Even if
this were construed as a contract for rental for the term of the plaintiff's life,
it would not be within the statute of frauds because it might be performed
within a year. The statute of frauds, section 2169, R. S.1919 [Mo. Rev.
Stat. (1939) § 3354], applies only to contracts which by their terms cannot
oe performed within a year."' 3 If the above dicta are followed an anomalous
situation will be presented. An oral lease or oral contract to lease for two
years by the owner of a fee or term for years is subject to the statute of
frauds. An oral lease or oral contract to lease for the life of the lessor, made
by a life tenant twenty-one years of age with a life expectancy fo 41.5314
years is not subject to the statute of frauds, even though the lease will in
the average case continue for more than forty years. The problem of reconciling the two pertinent sections of the statute of frauds with each other,
and reconciling both with the pertinent statutes in the chapter on landlord
and tenant is admittedly a difficult one.15 The problem should be thoroughly
reconsidered before the court makes a definitive holding.
DEDICATION

Rubin,6

was an action for a declaratory judgment on the
Haertlein v.
the plaintiff claimed was a public park. The
which
realty
status of certain
12. The court does not mention the possibility that the defendant had become
a tenant from year to year under Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 2969.
13. At p. 799. In support of this proposition the court cites four Missouri
cases, none of them dealing with an oral lease by a life tenant: Suggett's Adm'r v.
Cason's Adm'r, 26 Mo. 221 (1858) (contract to sell a slave); Wynn v. Followill,
98 Mo. App. 463, 72 S. W. 140 (1903) (contract to care for an infant); Matthews
v. Wallace, 104 Mo. App. 96, 78 S.W. 296 (1904) (contract of employment); and
Green v. Whaley, 271 Mo. 636, 197 S.W. 355 (1917) (agreement for division of
partnership personal property).
14. American Experience Table of Mortality.
15. See 49 Am.Jua., Statute of Frauds (1943) § § 49, 189-196.
16. 195 S.W. (2d) 480 (Mo. 1946).
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case probably reaches the correct result, viz., that the land in question was
a public park, but the reasons given for this conclusion are of doubtful
soundness, and the case indicates the inherent difficulty in actions for declaratory judgments of confining the judgment to sufficiently narrow issues.
On May 13, 1921, the Subdivision Co. filed for record a plat to a certain
tract. The plat showed an irregular area which had written thereon:
"reserved for Park." The next day the Subdivision Co. executed an instrument setting out certain restrictions which should operate as covenants
running with the land, and providing the restrictions should remain in force
until January 1, 1945, unless sooner extinguished by the owners of threefourths of the front feet of the affected area. The instrument further provided
as follows: "The North Pointe Subdivision Company has agreed and hereby
does agree that all avenues, streets, boulevards, drives, walks, alleys and
parks shown on the plat ... are to be and shall be dedicated to public use
forever" (italics added). On December 10, 1924, the Subdivision Co. executed and filed for record an instrument purporting to remove from the
park lot any restrictions for park purposes. On December 18, 1924, the
Subdivision Co. exeeuted another instrument purporting to remove from
the park lot all restrictions which restrict the same for park purposes, pursuant to the power conferred on the owner or owners of three-fourths of the
front feet to remove restrictions.
The trial court held that the plat burdened the park lot with an easement
in favor of all purchasers of other lots, and that by the instrument imposing
restrictions the park lot was dedicated to public use as a park, and that such
dedication was not affected by the subsequent attempt to release or revoke
such dedication. On appeal, the court stated that the dedication, if any,
was not an effective statutory dedication, and was effective if at all only as
a common law dedication. The court sets out the requirements for a common
law dedication: "In order to establish a common law dedication it must be
shown: (1) That the owner, by his unequivocal action, intended to dedicate
to public use; (2) that the land so dedicated must be accepted by the public;
and (3) that land so dedicated must be used by the public ....

All these

requirements are satisfied in the present case."
The plaintiff owned one of the lots in the addition. It does not appear
when he acquired title to his lot. The defendant acquired title to the park
lot "long subsequent to the filing of the plat and the entry of record of the
instrument dedicating the park to public use" [and presumably after the
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attemp~ted revocation of the dedication in 1924). The action for declaratory
judgment was started in 1939, some eighteen years after the declaration of
dedication in 1921. The record did not show how long the park lot had been
used for park purposes by lot owners in the addition or by the general public,
but did show that it had been so used by lot owners and the public "for many
years."
The court in the opinion devotes most of its attention to two problems:
first, whether the owner by unequivocal action, intended to dedicate to
public use; and second, whether a dedication for park purposes was a "restriction" subject to removal by action of the owners of three-fourths of the front
feet. The court correctly found intention to dedicate, and that park uses were
not a "restriction" subject to removal. On the other hand, the court says
nothing about the requirements that land so dedicated must be accepted by
the public and used by the public, except that "all these requirements are
satisfied in the present case." It is well established that dedication is not
complete until accepted.17 Therefore the real issue in the case was whether
there was an acceptance by the public prior to the 1924 revocation. Acceptance by user thereafter could not be pertinent to the problem of dedication.
Inasmuch as there was no proof of acceptance by user prior to the 1924
revocation, it is submitted that dedication was not complete, and therefore
there was no public park on the theory of dedication. The holding that the
park lot had become a public park could better be supported on the theory
of adverse user. The finding of user for park purposes "by the public in
general for many years" supports this theory, but the finding should have
been definite as to the number of years.
Likewise the narrower issue, whether the owner of the plaintiff's lot
had an easement in the park lot, could be answered in the affirmative by a
finding of adverse user for the requisite period, or a finding that the plaintiff's lot had been sold to him or a predecessor in title prior to the 1924
revocation or release of easement. It would seem that the plaintiff's real
interest was in establishing an easement, a private park, rather than in
establishing a public park.

17. See Hamshaw, Recent Cases (1938) 3 Mo. LAw REv. 200, where there is
an interesting discussion of the problem whether there can be sufficient acceptance
by the public so that the dedicator could no longer revoke, yet insufficient acceptance by the proper public authorities to impose on a municipal corporation a duty
to maintain the premises in proper repair.
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Abrams v. Lakewood Park Cemetery
presented another dedication problem. In 1920 one Mayer, who with his privies will hereinafter be
referred to as themortgagee, conveyed 240 acres of land to one Crinnion, who
with his privies will hereinafter be referred to as the mortgagor. The unpaid
part of the purchase price was evidenced by a note secured by a deed of trust
with the usual power of sale. In November, 1920, the mortgagor entered
into an agreement with the Cemetery Association, the mortgagor agreeing
to plat portions of the land for cemetery and burial grounds and to deed
to improved roadways to the Cemetery Association, the Cemetery Association agreeing to maintain the cemetery and handle the perpetual care
fund. Also in November, 1920, the mortgagor filed a plat subdividing into
burial lots two "sections." In March, 1921, the mortgagor filed a plat,
"General Plan Lakewood Park Cemetery," platting about 200 acres of the
larger tract into thirty-three sections, with winding drives around the sections, and chapel, crematory and superintendent's residence. This plat did
not subdivide any of the sections into burial lots, but covered the two sections previously subdivided. In 1921 and 1922 the mortgagor filed plats subdividing three sections. The mortgagee released from the deed of trust the
five subdivided sections in the period 1920-1925. In 1928 the mortgagor
issued an elaborate salesman's prospectus showing the whole 200 acre area
as a cemetery. Burial lots were sold only in the five subdivided sections
which had been released from the deed of trust; altogether there had been
some 1700 burials. It does not appear when the first lots were sold. In 1929
the original mortgagee assigned the notes to one Scott who had been active
in the maintenance, development and operation of the cemetery. In 1933
Scott caused the trustee to foreclose the deed of trust under the power of
sale and Scott became the purchaser through a straw party of all of the land
except the five sections previously released from the deed of trust.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding that all of the land
contained in the "General Plan" of thirty-three sections covering 200 acres
had been dedicated, used and accepted as a cemetery, even though only
five of the sections had been subdivided and used for burial purposes. The
court assume for purposes of the case that there had not been a statutory
dedication, but found a common law dedication.
A second problem was whether the fact that the mortgaged land had
become a cemetery with the consent of the montgagee rendered void the
power of sale and the foreclosure pursuant thereto. Earlier Missouri cases
18. 196 S.W. (2d) 278 (Mo. 1946).
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9

had indicated that in such cases the power of sale is void.? The court points

out that the only objection to foreclosures of mortgages on cemeteries is
their tendency to divert the property from the purposes to which it was
dedicated into ordinary commercial uses; and that if the property can be
protected as a cemetery, there can be no objection to foreclosure by power
of sale rather than by suit in equity. The court then holds that the trial
court erred in holding the foreclosure under the power of sale void, but that
at most it was voidable.
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

Swain v. Maxwell and Kraemer v. Shelley, 2- in able opinions by
Douglas, J., reaffirm the validity in Missouri of covenants restricting property
from transfer to or occupancy by negroes. Both cases are fully analyzed
and discussed in a recent case note in the Missouri Law Review.2 2 The
problem is an important one and the Supreme Court of the United States
probably will determine the validity of such racial restrictions during the
23
present term of court.
20

Matthews v. First Christian Church.of St. Louis24 was a suit to enjoin
use of property as a church, alleged to be in violation of covenants restricting
the use of land. The original restriction in 1892 was that buildings on these
lots "Shall never be used or occupied for any purpose except that of private
residence." In 1928 the restriction was amended to allow the buildings and
lots to be used "for retail mercantile business and apartments." The result
of combining the original restriction and the amendment is that the buildings
on these lots shall never be used or occupied for any purpose except that of
private residence, retail mercantile business, and apartments. The court
held that defendant's use of one of the restricted buildings as a church was a
prohibited use and consequently would be enjoined. The court found no
ambiguity in the terms of the restriction. It was also held that principles
19. United Cemeteries Co. v. Strother, 332 Mo. 971, 61 S. W. (2d) 907, 90
A. L. R. 438 (1933); Ottenad v. Mt. Hope Cemetery & Mausoleum Co., 176 S. W.
(2d) 62 (Mo. App. 1943).
20. 196 S. W. (2d) 780 (Mo. 1946).
21. 198 S. W. (2d) 679 (Mo. 1946).
22. Betz, Real Property-Restraintson Alienation-RacialRestrictions (1947)
12 Mo. LAW REV. 221.
23. An Associated Press dispatch dated October 5, 1947, stated that the
Supreme Court of the United States had granted certiorari in the Shelley case,
supra, n. 21, originating in St. Louis, Missouri, as well as in a similar case originating in Detroit, Michigan.
24. 197 S. W. (2d) 617 (Mo. 1946).
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of zoning law could not be applied to the construction of restrictive covenants,
and therefore it was immaterial that the local zoning law authorized churches
in a residential district, or that under zoning principles church use is a
higher class use than business or apartment use and therefore authorized.
The court reemphasizes that a restrictive covenant of this type creates, in
the owners of the dominant land, property in the nature of an easement
inthe servient land.
FUTURE INTERESTS

The opinion in Mattigly v. Was kbwup, 25 written by Bohling, C., is
particularly satisfying to the lawyer interested in property law. The opinion
is clear, concise, accurate, and with respect to reversions after "fees-tail"
states explicitly what has been assumed or overlooked in many previous
Missouri cases.28 A father granted land to his daughter and her bodily heirs.
The daughter, hereinafter referred to as the life tenant, had one son who
died at age 40, intestate and unmarried, leaving as his heirs at law the life
tenant and his father, both over seventy years of age. The life tenant's husband quit-claimed to the life tenant. The life tenant then brought a suit to
quiet title, claiming a fee simple, against the other heirs at law of her father.
Her theory was that she had a life estate by purchase from her father; that
her son had a vested remainder, subject to open to let in afterborn children;
that upon her son's death she inherited one-half of this remainder, and her
husband inherited the other one-half which he quit-claimed to her; and that
consequently she now owned a fee simple. The judgment of the trial court
was that she had a life estate only; this judgment was held to be essentially
correct. The court said: "Numerous cases hold that under the laws of this
State, R. S. 1939, Secs. 3498, 3500, Mo. R. S. A., conveyances to one and
his or her bodily heirs (creating an estate tail under the common law as in
the instant deeds) carves out of a grantor's fee-simple estate certain lesser
estates, viz.: first a life estate in the first taker; next a contingent remainder
in those qualifying as 'bodily heirs' on the death of the first taker, while the
fee, that is, the reversion, remains in the grantor, his assigns, heirs or devisees
pending the determination under the original grant of its vesting or falling in
for want of takers as 'bodily heirs' of said grantee for life." The court then
held that the daughter had neither pleaded nor proved any interest in the
reversion, by way of purchase, inter vivos or testamentary, or by descent
25. 196 S. W. (2d) 624 (Mo. 1946).
26. Eckhardt, The Destructibility of Contingent Remainders in Missouri
(1941) 6 Mo. LAW REv. 268, 290-295.
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from her father, the grantor and owner of the reversion. The judgment of
the trial court that plaintiff had a life estate only was to be without prejudice
to claims of ownership of the reversion.
It is believed that this is the first Missouri case to emphasize the fact
that there is a reversion following the contingent remainder created by the
Missouri fee-tail statute. This is particularly important in connection with
the problem of destructibility of contingent remainders by merger."
Any doubt as to the alienability of contingent remainders was removed
by the opinion in Grimes v. RUsh.28 The court held that a quit-claim deed
passes a contingent remainder wherein the person to take is not ascertained
as of the date of the grant. The contingent remainder in question was created
by a limitation to "Virginia I. Grimes for life and then to the heirs of her
body," and the quit-claim was by presumptive "heirs of the body." The
2 9'
case is discussed at length in a recent issue of the Missouri Law Review.
MORTGAGES

In Abrams v. Lakewood Park Cemetery AssW8° a mortgagee consented
to the dedication of certain land as a cemetery. One question was whether
the power of sale in the deed of trust was thereby rendered void. The case
is stated and the mortgage problem is discussed supra at p. 412.

TAXATION
PAUL

G. OCHTERBECK*

During the year 1946 the cases decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri in the field of taxation covered many different phases of this subject.
These cases have been separated for discussion under topics, as follows:
I-Bonds and Other Obligations Issued By Public Corporations and Political
Subdivisions; II-Corporation Taxes; III-Drainage Taxes; IV-Exemption
From Taxation; V-Fire Districts; VI-General Rules of Construction;
27. Supra, n. 26.
28. 197 S. W. (2d) 310 (Mo. 1946).
29. Gibson, Real Property-Contingent Remainders-Alienability (1947)
Mo. LAw REv. 218.
30. Supra, n. 18.

12

*Attorney, St. Louis. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1931.
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VII-Municipal Taxes; VIII-Road Taxes; IX-Sales Tax; X-Special
Tax Bills; and XI-Unemployment Compensation Taxes.
I. BONDS AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS ISSUED BY PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AND
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS

In State ex rel. Curators of University of Mo. v. McReynolds,' the

Board of Curators, a public corporation, 2 was held to have implied power and
authority to issue Dormitory Revenue Bonds payable solely from the
revenues from the operation of the dormitories. Additional dormitory facilities at Columbia and Rolla had been found necessary due to the greatly
increased enrollment.
In State ex rel. City of Fdton v. Smith,3 the voters in the City of Fulton
authorized $200,000.00 of revenue bonds to extend and improve the city's
water and electric light works by more than the four-sevenths (4/7th)
majority required by Sec. 27 of Art. VI of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945.
This constitutional provision was held self-executing and not to require legislative action to put it into effect. The election which was held pursuant to
statutes not specifically applicable and held valid. This opinion certainly
reaches a just result and one contemplated by the new section of the constitution previously referred to. Prior to the adoption of the new constitution
4
no such election was necessary.
In Arkansas-MissouriPower Corp. v. City of Potosi,5 irregularities occurring during an election to authorize the issuance of $60,000.00 of general
obligation bonds to erect or purchase an electric light plant were held not
to authorize a suit in equity to enjoin the issuance, registration and sale of
the bonds. The irregularities complained of were that unauthorized persons
acted as judges and clerks; and that the election was held at places not
authorized by the ordinance. These irregularities were held insufficient to
give the Court jurisdiction. As the supreme court points out, any other ruling would invite proceedings in equity to enjoin the issuance of bonds.
In Ginger v. Halferty,6 bonds issued for funding judgment indebtedness
of the county were held valid even though the ballot by which the county
1. 354 Mo. 1199, 193 S. W. (2d) 611 (1946).
2. Todd v. Curators of University of Mo., 347 Mo. 460, 147 S. W. (2d) 1063,
1064 (1941).
3. 194 S. W. (2d) 302 (Mo. 1946).
4. City of Springfield v. Monday, 353 Mo. 981, 185 S. W., (2d) 788 (1945);
11 Mo. LAW REV. 394 (1946).
5. 196 S. W. (2d) 152 (Mo. 1946).
6. 193 S. W. (2d) 503 (Mo. 1946).
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authorities submitted the proposition to the voters did not exactly follow
the statute. The statute was held to be directory. The ballots were held
to substantially follow the statute.
In State ex rel. Montgomery v. Nordberg,7 Sec. 23 of Art IV of the
Constitution of Missouri, 1945, was held not to require counties to begin
their fiscal year on July 1 so as to invalidate tax anticipation warrants issued by the County Court of Jackson County. An interesting question of
whether counties were included within the phrase "of the state and all its
agencies" was presented. The court by making a close analysis of the Constitution of 1945 decided that counties were not included in the above quoted
phrase.
In State ex rel. Ginger v. Palmer," county road warrants issued after
there were no funds available to pay same were held illegal and void. County
warrants were further held to be non-negotiable instruments so that plaintiff as an assignor for value had no greater rights than his assignee. This
was a suit on the county clerk's official bond for wrongfully issuing the warrants. Plaintiff was held entitled to only nominal damages because the loss
was occasioned by plaintiff's assignor furnishing road supplies after the
county had exhaused its constitutional power to contract debts. The loss
was not caused by the illegal issuance of the warrants.
II.

CORPORATION TAXES

In State ex rel. H. D. Lee Co. v. Bell,9 the court held that under the new
Corporation Code'0 a foreign corporation is entitled to have an amendment
extending its corporate existence filed with the Secretary of State without
being required to pay another domestication tax which is required of a foreign corporation when it originally enters the state. The new Corporation
Code was held to abolish the old requirement of another tax based on capital when the corporate existence of either a foreign or domestic corporation
is extended.
III. DRAINAGE TAXES

In State ex tel. Walker v. Big Medicine DrainageDist." the court held
that a suit for a mandatory injunction would lie to compel the surviving
members of the last board of supervisors of a drainage district to rebuild
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

354 Mo. 952, 193 S. W. (2d) 10 (1946).
198 S.W. (2d) 10 (Mo. 1946).
195 S.W. (2d) 492 (Mo. 1946).
Mo. Laws 1943, pp. 410-491.
196 S.W. (2d) 254 (Mo. 1946).
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and repair bridges and approaches where the district's drainage ditch intersected public highways and to compel the levy of taxes necessary for such
rebuilding and repair.
IV.

EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION

In Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Mo. v. Hoehn,12 two corporations,
the "Synod" and the "Publishing House," brought suit to have their real
estate declared exempt from city taxes on the grounds that the real estate
was used exclusively for religious worship and purposes purely charitable.
The Publishing House holds title to the real estate for the use and benefit of
the Synod. The exemption claimed was denied for the following reasons:
(1) Under Sec. 8 of Art II of the Constitution of Missouri, 1875,"8 the
Synod, a religious corporation and the claimed real holder of title, could not
legally hold title to real estate for use as a publishing house inasmuch as this
provision limited the use of the real estate of a religious corporation to
"church edifices, parsonages and cemeteries." (2) What the "Synod" could
not do directly, it could not do indirectly by having the Publishing House
hold title. (3) If it cannot legally hold title to the real estate, it cannot
claim an exemption.- (4) Furthermore, the real estate was not "used" "exclusively for religious worship" or for "purposes purely charitable" as required by Sec. 6 of Art. X of the Constitution of Missouri, 1875.14 The business conducted by the Publishing House was a commercial book business
operated for profit, and the fact that its profits were used for religious purposes was held to make no differencer
In Northeast Osteopathic Hospital v. Keitel,16 the hospital claimed to
be exempt from unemployment compensation taxes because it was organized
for purely charitable purposes. The supreme court held that not only must
the hospital charter prove that it was "organized" exclusively for charitable
purposes, but that the evidence as to the hospital's operation must prove
that it is "operated" exclusively for charitable purposes.17 The court held
12. 196 S. W. (2d) 134 (Mo. 1946).

13. This section was omitted from the Constitution adopted in 1945.
14. This section was rewritten as Sec. 6 of Art. X in the Constitution of 1945.
The rewording in the new Constitution would not allow an exemption in this type
of case.
15. See Mo. Laws 1945, p. 1800, § 5, where the "use" test is written into the
statute carrying § 6 of Art. X of the new Constitution into effect.
16. 197 S.W. (2d) 970 (Mo. 1946).
17. The statute requires the corporation to be "organized and operated exclusively for ...

charitable ...

clause (F) of MissouRi REvisED
p. 921.

purposes." See Sec. 9423, sub. sec. (i), par. (6),
STATUTEs
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that neither the charter nor the evidence of its operation sustained the hospital's claim for exemption. The reasoning in this case demonstrates the
necessity of closely examining the law granting the exemption and of being
able to prove all the requirements of that law.

V. FIRE DISTRICTS
In Nolting v. City of Overland,'8 the supreme court held that its ruling
in the case of State ex rel. Fire District of Lenuy v. Smith,' 9 that Sec. 34 of
the Fire District Law was unconstitutional, was not obiter and would not
be reviewed again.
VI. GENERAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTON
Construction Of Statute By Administrative Tribunal. While the con-

struction placed on the law by the administrative tribunal may be entitled
to some weight, it must give way to an unambiguous statute and regulations
indicating a contrary practice.20
VII. MUNICIPAL TAXES

During 1946, the supreme court decided two cases relating to taxes
levied by municipal corporations. In Nolting v. City of Overland,21 certain
municipal taxes in recently annexed territory and the ordinance extending

the city limits were held void because much of the land sought to be annexed
was farm land that had not been platted or offered for sale as town lots and
was not needed for municipal purposes.
In State ex rel. Audrain Co. v. City of Mexico,22 Audrain County per-

mitted the City of Mexico, in widening the street around the square, to encroach upon the table square which was owned by the county. Eight years
later the city established parking meter zones on this land owned by the
county. The county objected. The supreme court held that as long as the
county permits the use of its land for street purposes, the city has the power

to regulate parking by installing parking meters.
VIII. RoAD TAXES
In State ex rel. Essex Special Road Dist. v. Vinson,23 the road district

sought to recover taxes from the township which had been levied for general
18. 354 Mo. 960, 192 S.W. (2d) 863 (1946).
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

353 Mo. 807, 184 S. W. (2d) 593 (1945).
Peerless Fixture Co. v. Keitel, 195 S. W. (2d) 449 (Mo. 1946).
354 Mo. 960, 192 S. W. (2d) 863 (1946).
197 S. W. (2d) 301 (Mo. 1946).
198 S. W. (2d) 232 (Mo. 1946).
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county purposes and apportioned to the township for general township purposes. The court correctly held there could be no such recovery. The road
district had mistaken its remedy to compel the levy of additional taxes to
which it was entitled for road purposes. The mistake was apparently caused
by the complexity of the road, tax and revenue laws relating to counties
under township organization.
IX. SALES TAX
In Van Hoose v. Smit, 24 Van Hoose was assessed $4,971.62 in additional
sales tax on account of sales of used cars by an alleged partner. Van Hoose
brought a certiorari proceeding to quash the additional assessment upon the
ground that he was not a partner. The person who operated the used car
business testified that Van Hoose furnished the money; that after expenses,
they split the profits; and that profits and losses were handled on a 50 per
cent basis. Van Hoose did not testify. The circuit court quashed the additional assessment. On appeal the supreme court held that there was no
evidence to sustain the judgment of the circuit court; that it should be reversed; and that a judgment be entered against Van Hoose for the tax,
penalty and interest.
X.

SPECIAL

TAx BILLS

In Brink v. Kansas City,25 the plaintiff, as assignee for several hundred
property owners who had paid tax bills which were afterwards held void, 20
instituted this action against Kansas City to recover the amounts paid on
the tax bills with interest. The defenses asserted were: (1) voluntary payment of the tax bills; (2) defendant was ordered to issue the tax bills by a
mandamus suit brought by contractor; (3) defendant paid the money to
the contractor; and (4) plaintiff's assignors got value received in the sewer
which the contractor constructed. These defenses were held not to bar a recovery by plaintiff. Judge Bradley makes a very thorough analysis of the
Missouri cases as to when taxes are paid voluntarily and when they are paid
under duress. This analysis will be helpful to lawyers who want to bring
suits to recover taxes illegally collected.
24. 198 S. W. (2d) 23 (Mo. 1946).
25. 198 S. W. (2d) 710 (Mo. 1946).
26. Ruckels v. Pryor, 351 Mo. 819, 174 S. W. (2d) 185 (1943) (Tax bills
were held void because of conspiracy to eliminate competitive bidding); see 9 Mo.
LAW. REv. 338 (1944) for brief comment.
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XI. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION TAXES
27
In Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Corp. v. Uinemployment C mp. CoM.,

the constitutionality of the Amendment of 194328 classifying employers into
three groups so as to collect a greater rate of tax from employers starting or
greatly expanding their business on account of war conditions was challenged.
Judge Hyde in a well reasoned opinion upheld the constitutionality of the
amendment and clearly demonstrated that the classification was fair and
reasonable, that there was no unlawful delegation of legislative powers to
the commission, and that the amendment was not retrospective in its operation.
In Peerless Fixture Co. v. Keite, 29 the court held that there was substantial evidence to support the commission's finding that Conrad Shower
had actual joint control of a corporation and an individually owned business
so that both employers were taxable as one employing unit under the provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Law. The case of Kellogg v.
M-Urpky 0 was followed on the question of actual joint control. The court
further held that the decision of the commission in 1939 that the corporation
ceased to be subject to the Unemployment Compensation Law could not be
reopened in 1941. The amendment of 194181 authorizing the commission to
reopen its decisions was held not applicable because not in effect when the
order reopening its 1939 decision was made.
See the case of Northeast Osteopathic Hospital v. Keital, 2 discussed
under subdivision IV hereof on the question of exemption from unemployment compensation taxes.
TORTS
Glenn A. McCleary*
In reviewing the decisions in the field of Torts each year, the reviewer
is always impressed with the usual ways in which our common law grows
and is extended, not so much by great questions and great cases as by new
27. 354 Mo. 1017, 193 S. W. (2d) 1 (1946).
28. Mo. Laws 1943, pp. 909-917.
29. 195 S. W. (2d) 449 (Mo. 1946).
30. 349 Mo. 1165, 164 S. W. (2d) 285 (1942)-see statement of facts in this
case in 8 Mo. LAW REV. 284 (1943).
31. Mo. Laws 1941, p. 586.
32. 197 S. W. (2d) 970 (Mo. '1946).
*Professor of Law and Dean of the-Law Schbol, University of Missouri.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947

51

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [1947], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 12

applications of well established principles to slightly new sets of facts; or, as
Mr. Justice Holmes once observed, by the common run of decisions which
have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some interstitial change in the very tissue of the law. It is for this reason that the
cases in this field decided during the year under review afford any student of
the law with materials which are well worth studying as a collection, and in
so doing one appreciates the manner in which the judicial process works in
attempting to achieve justice between men. The torts cases decided in this
period involving the humanitarian doctrine continue, due to their significance
to the jurisprudence of Missouri, to receive a separate and more adequate
treatment by Mr. Becker at another place in this issue.

I.

NEGLIGENCE

A. Duties of persons in certain relations
1. Possessors of land
There were three decisions involving the liability of proprietors of public places for injuries received by invitees from alleged conditions of the
floors. Putting the three cases together the reader gets a good idea of the
essential facts which must be alleged and proved for a recovery.
The fact that the materials in a store lobby entrance had become smooth
and polished from wear and were slippery when wet does not necessarily
subject a store proprietor to liability for injuries sustained by a customer in
a fall, where it is common knowledge that a smooth, highly polished surface
is slippery when wet, and where the slippery condition was as obvious to the
customer as to the proprietor. In Schmoll v. National Shirt Shops of Missouri,1 the evidence showed that the store lobby entrance was paved with
"terrazzo," a kind of flooring made of small chips of marble set irregularly in
cement and polished. Brass strips about an eighth of an inch wide separated
the colors of the varicolored pattern of the floor. The brass strips are useful
in preventing the flooring from cracking when expanded or contracted by
heat or cold. Words in brass lettering spelling the name of the defendant's
shop were also embedded in the terrazzo. The materials used in the construction of the floor were commonly used; likewise it is common to embed brass
letters or designs indicating the store's name in the terrazzo flooring of lobbies, entranceways, and vestibules of stores. Looking down on the letters,
they indicate a very highly polished surface. Brass becomes smooth and
1. 354 Mo. 1164, 193 S. W. (2d) 605 (1946).
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highly polished by wear and in this condition is slippery when wet. The
plaintiff saw this highly polished surface and it was seen by her to be wet.
The court held that the plaintiff had as much knowledge of the condition of
the brass lettering as had the defendant, since it was common knowledge
that a smooth, highly polished surface is slippery when wet. The defendant
was held to owe no duty to anticipate that its patrons would fail to appreciate dangers known to be inherent in conditions that were obvious. A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed for error in overruling defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
A similar theory of liability was presented in Harperv. First National
Bank of Kansas City,2 where the trial court had sustained defendant's motion for a directed verdict in an action brought for personal injuries sustained
from a fall on the defendant's floor. The plaintiff had gone to the office of
the assistant cashier in charge of the women's department on a business matter. The office floor was six inches above the level of the lobby floor and
was of a darker color. The assistant cashier in charge of the office placed .a
chair for the plaintiff to occupy while business matters were considered so
close to the step that the plaintiff, on rising from her chair and in turning to
leave the office, stepped unexpectedly from the office floor onto the lobby
floor, causing her to fall and to sustain the injuries complained of. The negligence alleged was in maintaining the raised office floor without guard rails
or gate at the entrance to the raised platform, knowing of the small size of
the office space on the platform and knowing it was so arranged that customers would normally stand or be seated in such a manner that the entrance
would be behind them or to their side in such close proximity that by making a single movement of stepping to the rear or to the side they would fall
off of the platform, in arranging the chair in which the plaintiff was invited
to sit with her back or side in such close proximity to the step, and in failing to warn the plaintiff of the dangerous position of the chair. There was
also an allegation that the defendant negligently maintained a covering on
the office floor which, under the artificial light, blended into the general appearance of the marble lobby floor immediately beneath, so that one unfamiliar with the arrangement would be liable to mistake the edge of the entrance to the platform for the marble of the lobby floor. Plaintiff's counsel
did not contend that there was a duty to warn of the fact that there was a
step, as the plaintiff was chargeable with knowledge that the step was there

2. 196 S. W. (2d) 265 (Mo. 1946).
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as she had ascended the step on entering the office and therefore would have
to remember it when she left the office, but the plaintiff did contend that a
dangerous condition was created by the defendant in placing the chair so
close to the edge of the step without plaintiff's knowledge. The court held
that this was just as obvious to the plaintiff as it was to the defendant's
officer, and such being so, there was no duty upon the defendant to warn
3
plaintiff of the proximity of her chair to the outer edge of the step.
In contrast to the two preceding cases is Corley v. Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co.4 This was an action for injuries received by a customer who fell
when she stepped upon a metal strip on the step to the entrance to defendant's store. The strip was at the time wet and covered with a film of snow.
Plaintiff's theory of negligence was based on the issue that the metal strip
had been worn smooth in the middle by many people stepping upon it; that
when covered with a film of snow this smoothness was concealed from view;
that the defendant could reasonably anticipate the slippery and dangerous
condition of the step when such condition was hidden from view by a film of

snow; and that the defendant had notice of all this for a sufficient time to
have corrected the situation. There was evidence that two persons had
fallen on the step on the same day prior to the plaintiff's fall, and this to the
knowledge of the defendant. The plaintiff had a verdict in the trial court
which was reversed on appeal to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, with one
judge dissenting. On certification to the supreme court, the court thought
that the majority of the court of appeals "inadvertently overlooked testimony to the effect that the smoothness of the metal strip was hidden from
view at the time by a film of snow," and held that "a finding that defendant
had notice and a superior knowledge over plaintiff of the condition was
within the evidence." The judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.
The standard of care required of a gas company in dealing with its dangerous commodity was directly ruled for the first time in Stephens v. Kansas
City Gas Co.' The action was against the Kansas City Gas Company and
3. The principle of law ruling this and the preceding case is: "A landowner
is not liable to an invitee for injuries resulting from an obvious condition as well
known to the invitee as to the owner, and if the invitee is aware of the condition,
or it is such that he must be conscious of it and of the consequences of disregarding it,
he cannot recover." Id. at 267.
4. 193 S. W. (2d) 897 (Mo. 1946).
5. 354 Mo. 835, 191 S. W. (2d) 601 (1946). Another case arising out of
the same explosion, for the death of the plaintiff's wife who was standing in front
of the building when the explosion blew up the sidewalk causing her death, is Hardwick v. Kansas City Gas Co., 195 S. W. (2d) 504 (Mo. 1946).
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the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company for injuries sustained in an exsplosion in a building owned and operated by the insurance company and
furnished with natural gas by the gas company. The gas company, a public
utility, also operated a gas main under a heavily traveled public street on
which this building adjoined. The plaintiff was a porter in a barbershop located in the basement of the building and, while engaged in his work, was
injured by an explosion which, in the opinion of experts, was a natural gas
explosion, the gas coming from outside the building and from a break in the
main under the street. In an instruction given at the request of the plaintiff,
the jury was advised that "'by due care' as used in these instructions . . .
was meant the highest degree of care. By 'the highest degree of care' is meant
that care which a very careful and prudent preson would use under the same
or similar circumstances." The court reversed the judgment obtained by
the plaintiff against the gas company in the trial court for error in giving
this instruction and held that the gas company "was only required to use
such degree of care as an ordinary prudent person would exercise under like
circumstances in dealing with such a dangerous commodity. 'Ordinary care'
is a relative term, and its exercise requires precautions commensurate with
the dangers to be reasonably anticipated under the circumstances."
2. Automobiles
Whether the plaintiff had made a submissible case, on defendant's motion for a directed verdict, under the humanitarian doctrine and on primary negligence antecedant to the humanitarian situation was presented in
Lowry v. Mohlt. 7 The specific issues of primary negligence of the defendant
were in failing to give a warning of his approach, in traveling at an excessive
speed under the circumstances, in failing to yield the right of way to the car
in which plaintiff was riding, and in failing to operate his car as near to the
right-hand side of the highway as practicable. The collision occurred at a
right-angle intersection of graded highways. The car in which the plaintiff
was riding was approaching the intersection from the east on an east-west
road, and the defendant's car was approaching from the south on the northsouth highway. The collision occurred "just about the center of the intersection." There was a partial obstruction of view due to the foliage of weeds
near the southeast corner of the intersection. The facts relating to the sur6. All questions involving the humanitarian doctrine are reviewed, if of sufficient significance, under the topic elsewhere in this issue.
7. 195 S. W. (2d) 652 (Mo. 1946).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947

55

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [1947], Art. 1

426

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

rounding circumstances were meager, as the court pointed out, and "the evidence leaves much information to be desired as to distances, weather conditions, visibility, condition of the surface of the gravel of the roadways, the
width and type of the respective highways, and vehicular travel.. . ." There
were no facts shown touching upon the defendant's familiarity or unfamiliarity with the location of the intersection, and no evidence from which the
inference could be drawn that the defendant, in the exercise of the highest
degree of care, could not have seen or that he did see the car in which plaintiff was riding approaching from the right. Stressing the favored position
that the latter car had in approaching the intersection from the right of the
defendant's car, although not giving the former the unqualified and unconditional right to proceed across the north-south road under all circumstances,
the court was of the opinion that the issues of the defendant's negligence in
traveling at excessive speed under the circumstances, in failing to sound a
warning signal, and in failing to give the right of way to the automobile in
which plaintiff was riding were for the jury.
In Sawyer v. Winterholder s the court sustained a motion for a new
trial on the ground that the verdict for the defendant was against the greater
weight of evidence. This was an action for the death of an eight year old
bicyclist when struck by the defendant's automobile which was approaching
from the opposite direction. It was twilight, and the boy was traveling east,
the bicycle on the right or south side of the pavement. The defendant, traveling west on the same street, struck the bicycle as he was passing another
car also traveling west. The evidence showed that after the defendant had
stopped his car on the south side of the pavement the bicycle was underneath
the front wheel and bumper of the car, and the boy was lying about 30 feet
from the car and five or six feet south of the pavement. There were skid
marks on the pavement from the defendant's car for a distance of about 60
feet. The plaintiff's theory of defendant's liability was predicated on driving
in the south lane of traffic and in crossing from the north to the south side
-of the pavement, on excessive speed, and on failure to keep a lookout for
other traffic upon the highway while overtaking and passing another car.
The court pointed out that, while the fact of the skid marks of an automobile upon the highway may not in and of itself constitute negligence, the
fact that the skid marks were upon the south side of the pavement for a distance of 60 feet, put there as he overtook and attempted to pass another ye8. 195 S. W. (2d) 659 (Mo. 1946).
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hide at twilight, would support an inference that the defendant failed to
maintain the proper lookout for vehicles, including the bicycle as it approached from the opposite direction, and that he was negligent in driving
upon the south side of the pavement under the circumstances.
3. Railroads
Section 5162 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, 1939, provides in substance that any railroad which leases to a foreign corporation, or permits it
to use its railroad, shall remain liable for the acts of the other. Section 5163
also provides that whenever any railroad, street railway or other railway
company shall permit any other corporation, under any running agreement,
to run cars upon its road or track in this state, the owner corporation shall
be liable for the acts of the user. In Francis v. Terminal Railroad Ass'z

of St. Louis," it was held that these statutes are applicable to the right of
lessor railroad's employee to recover from lessor under the Federal Em-

ployers' Liability Act for injuries sustained when struck by a train of the
lessee and were not in conflict with the federal act. It was also held that
this liability under the statutes was not lessened merely because the de-

fendant company must permit under the law the use of its facilities to
the various railroads coming into the city indiscriminately. "Merely because the defendant company must permit the use of its facilities to the various railroad does not take from the defendant control over operations." The
grounds of negligence relied upon were that no warning was given of the ap-

proach of the Wabash engine, and that the defendant failed to furnish the
plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work.
An interesting interpretation of the application of the Federal Employers' Liability Act for the death of a brakeman was made in Ford v. Louisvile & Nashville R. R.-0 The parties had stipulated that, at the time of the
accident, the train consisted of empty cars and had originated at a point in
Kentucky and was going to a point in Kentucky where they would then receive loads and start back; that this was a routine part of their duties day
in and day out; and that on the occasion in question, had no injury to the
deceased brakeman interfered, they would have received for the return trip
on the next day loaded cars, some of which were interstate (destined beyond
the state limits of Kentucky) and some intrastate (destined within the confines of the state of Kentucky). There was no showing of the proportion of
9. 354 Mo. 1232, 193 S. W. (2d) 909 (1946).
10. 196 S. W. (2) 163 (Mo. 1946).
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cars destined within and beyond the limits of the state. Although the deceased would not have completed his tour of duty until the next day, when
the train would have made the return part of the trip, it was held, under the
act, to be unnecessary that any part of the employee's duties be in furtherance of interstate commerce on the very day of the injury; that "any part
of whose duties shall be in furtherance of interstate commerce," as provided in the act, means to include any part of the employee's duties on the
particular mission or continuous operation to which he is assigned for the
particular work period or tour of duty on which he has commenced to serve.
Here the deceased would not have completed his tour of duty until the next
day when his train would have returned with loaded freight cars, some of
which would have been interstate. It was also held that a submissible case
was made where the evidence supported a finding that the engineer negligently caused the train to move at an excessive rate of speed at the time
when the deceased brakeman, to the knowledge of the engineer, was preparing to alight from the engine when, under conditions prevailing, the engine
and train should have been stopped or its speed slackened so as to afford
the deceased a reasonably safe opportunity to alight therefrom. Due to the
ice and snow on the concrete station platform, the jury had the right to infer that a train speed of 10 to 12 miles per hour negligently caused the deceased to slip and slide on the snow and ice under the train."1
11. Other cases involving the liability of railroads may be noted. In Lavender
v. Kum, 189 S. W. (2d) 253 (Mo. 1945), the court reversed outright a judgment on
the ground that the plaintiff failed to make a submissible case in an action under
the Federal Employer's Liability Act for the death of a railroad switch tender on
the theory that the deceased was struck on the head by a mail hook swinging from
the side of a mail car of the defendant railroad company. The Supreme Court of
the United States granted certiorari and held that the plaintiffs had made a submissible case, but under the res gestae rule. The Missouri judgment was reversed
by the United States Supreme Court, 66 Sup. Ct. 740 (1946), and the cause remanded for further proceedings "not inconsistent" with the opinion of the Supreme
Court. The case was reargued before the Missouri Supreme Court, but no additional briefs were filed. In 195 S. W. (2d) 460 (Mo. 1946), the judgment in the
trial court was reversed and the cause remanded on the ground that testimony
admitted under the res gestae rule was based on hearsay. In two cases against
railroads negligence was based on failure to observe an alleged custom or practice.
In Young v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 192 S. W. (2d) 402 (Mo. 1946), for
injuries sustained by an airman during switching operations, a submissible case
was made on evidence showing a custom to advise airman in advance of switching
movements, and evidence that the airman had not been correctly informed of
switching movements on tract where he was injured. To the same effect, is Jones
v. Thompson, 193 S. W. (2d) 593 (Mo. 1946), where the plaintiff's case was based

upon the violation of a custom for the conductor of the defendant's switching crew
to notify employees of a mill, where plaintiff was employed, when cars set on a switch
track were ready for grain-doors to be placed therein, and not thereafter to move
such cars until the mill employees notified the crew that the work had been completed. Walsh v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 196 S.W. (2d) 192 (Mo. 1946),
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss4/1

58

1947]

et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court 1946

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1946

429

4. Supplier of a chattel
A manufacturer is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as inwas an action for an injury sustained as a result of the failure of a railroad switching
crew to warn the plaintiff, who was unloading a car, of a switching movement. The
freight car was loaded with 18 reels of electric cable, each weighing from 1800 to
2000 pounds. Coupling into and moving the car caused the reel and cable to roll
and shift which, as plaintiff alleged, necessitated in the emergency his jumping
from the car. A submissible case was made as to whether the switching crew knew,
or bV the exercise of ordinary care would have known, that someone was likely to
be in the car incident to unloading it, thereby raising a duty to give warning. Petty
v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 198 S. W. (2d) 684 (Mo. 1946), was an action
brought by the parents for the loss of services and other damages resulting from
the negligence of the defendant in running its streetcar over the plaintiff's minor
daughter. The plaintiff's case was submitted upon the violation of three Kansas
City ordinances. One of the grounds of appeal, from a verdict for the plaintiffs,
was that one of the ordinances, upon which the negligence of the defendant was
predicated, had been repealed. Section 638 of the Traffic Code of 1928 provided
that a streetcar shall not be run "at a greater rate of speed than fifteen miles per
hour in the congested district" which was defined as that portion of the city
lying north of the south line of 19th street and west of the east line of Troost, "nor
more than twenty-five miles per hour in the noncongested district of the city."
In 1940, a further traffic ordinance, No. 6412, was enacted providing that a streetcar
may not be operated "at a greater speed than is reasonable" and "in any residence
or business district" (territory contiguous to a highway when 50% or more of the
frontage for a distance of 300 feet is occupied by buildings in use for business) "may
be operated at a speed of twenty-five miles per hour." Both ordinances were made
a part of Ordinance 7100 in the 1941 Revised Ordinances. The appellant contended
that the ordinance of 1940 repealed the ordinance enacted in 1928 as there could
not be two speed limits for streetcars in business districts, one of 15 miles per hour
and one at 25 miles per hour, and that being in direct conflict the later ordinance
repealed the older one. The court held that there was "no conflict in the ordinance's
speed limit of fifteen miles an hour 'in the (defined) congested district.' The older
ordinance merely carved a 'congested district' out of a 'Business district' and there
was no reconcilable conflict" In Albrecht v. Louisiana & Missouri River R. R., 195
S. W. (2d) 648 (Mo. 1946), the action was for injuries sustained by plaintiff due
to a fall when a sidewalk footbridge on railroad's right of way slipped forward because of the wet and slippery condition of the ground on which the ends of the
bridge rested, the condition of the footbridge being due to rainfall on the surface
and not to water in the ditch. The court held that negligence could not be predicated on the statute making it the duty of railroads to construct and maintain
suitable ditches and drains, to carry off water whenever the draining of such water
had been obstructed or rendered necessary by the construction of the railroad, as
the statute was intended mainly to compel railroads, when they obstructed the
natural drainage, to take steps to prevent the overflow of adjacent land, and there
was no showing that the plaintiff's injury was caused by an insufficiency of the
ditch. Negligence could not be based on the statute requiring railroads to construct a sufficient crossing of designated length, of a specified kind and with sufficient

approaches, since the injuries were sustained along the right of way outside of such

crossing and approaches. Nor could negligence be based on the railroad's common
law duty in maintaining a sidewalk on its right of way, as the evidence showed
that the wooden footbridge over the ditch had been put there by the city when, in
paving the street over the railroad crossing, it had removed from the drainage ditch
a galvanized iron -pipe under the cinder sidewalk, and there was no evidence that
the defendant ever constructed, maintained or repaired the sidewalk. Settle v.
Baldwin, 196 S. W. (2d) 299 (Mo. 1946), involved the liability of a railroad for

furnishing a car which was not in a reasonably .afe condition for loading as discussed in the text under "Supplier of a chattel."
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volving an unreasonable risk of causing substantial harm to those who lawfully use it in a manner and for a purpose for which it is manufactured. The
case of Zesch. v. Abrasive Company of Philadelphia1 2 was an action for injuries resulting from the exploding of an abrasive cutting-off wheel manufactured by the defendant, where it was undisputed that the wheel was designed for use in cutting with its edge. The theory of the defense was that
the plaintiff was not entitled to recover if the wheel was being used for a
purpose and in a manner contrary to its intended use. The jury returned a
verdict for the defendant, but a motion for a new trial was sustained upon
the specified ground of error in the giving of defendant's instruction as follows: "You are instructed that if you find and believe from the evidence
that plaintiff attempted to use the abrasive cut-off wheel mentioned in the
evidence in a manner and for a purpose for which it was not designed, manufactured and sold, and if you further find that the manner in which plaintiff
attempted to use the wheel was improper under the circumstances, and that
the wheel was caused to break or shatter as a direct and proximate result of
such improper use (if any), and that it did not break or shatter as a direct
and proximate result of negligence (if any) of the defendant, then your verdict must be against plaintiff and in favor of the defendant." The plaintiff
(respondent) urged that the instruction was erroneous in that it failed to
hypothesize the specific facts of improper use upon which the defendant relied for a verdict. The court pointed out that, by proffering this instruction,
the defendant invoked no defense of acts of the plaintiff as the sole cause of
the plaintiff's injury, and the instruction did not submit an issue of contributory negligence. The instruction merely adopted the plaintiff's theory of the
defendant's duty to test the wheel for defects rendering it unsafe for use in
the manner and for the purpose intended, submitted defendant's view of the
effect of the evidence, and negatived the basic and determinative element of
the plaintiff's theory of recovery as submitted in plaintiff's instruction ("the
shattering of the wheel in its use, 'in a proper, regular and customary manner, and for a purpose for which it was manufactured and intended"'). Since
that which was submitted as a cause in the negative of the ultimate facts essential to plaintiff's case as submitted in his instruction, the plaintiff could
not complain of the defendant's instruction which presented the defendant's
side of the case and the same view of the law as adopted by the plaintiff.
Principles of liability applicable to a supplier of a chattel were applied
12.

354 Mo. 1147, 193 S. W. (2d) 581 (1946).
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to an interesting situation in Settle v.Baldwin." The evidence showed a
tripartite contract between the defendant railroad, a contractor to which
the railroad had delegated the task of icing and re-icing refrigerator cars supplied by it to the defendant railroad, and a subcontractor which had agreed
to manufacture, sell and deliver the ice into the bunkers of the refrigerator
cars. Under the contract the defendant undertook to set empty cars to be
furnished by the contractor at the subcontractor's docks where they were to
be loaded with ice and to transport such cars to the icing station, the cars to
be transported free of charge but solely over the defendant's rails and at the
subcontractor's risk. The plaintiff was an employee of the ice company and
was injured while engaged in loading ice manufactured by the ice company
into a car belonging to the contractor. The verdict for the plaintiff in damages was set aside by the trial court and judgment rendered for the defendants notwithstanding the verdict, from which ruling the plaintiff appealed.
The negligence alleged on the part of the defendant was in furnishing an old
refrigerator car to the subcontractor which was not in a reasonably safe condition for loading, in breach of its duty as a common carrier to ascertain that
cars furnished were in a reasonably safe condition. The injury was alleged
to be due to the dangerous condition of the floor of the car in that it was
"unstable, springy and dangerous." The defendant contended that the car
was not the property of the railroad company and was not in its service nor
furnished by it; that the car owned by the independent contractor had been
removed from regular commercial service and had been placed in the possession of the ice company as a subcontractor for transporting the ice; that the
ice company was in the exclusive control of the car and it was its duty to
inspect the car; and that the railroad company had no power, authority or
duty to make such an inspection. The defendant also contended that its nondelegable duty to furnish safe cars obtains only when the cargo is to be
transported by the carrier as a common carrier, and that such duty did not
obtain here where the ice was not received for carriage by the railroad company as a common carrier, but was to be transported under the provisions
of the tripartite contract for the railroad company's own use. The trial court
in setting aside a verdict for the plaintiff and in rendering judgment for the
defendant ruled "it was not shown by the evidence that defendants (Railroad Company) furnished the car in which plaintiff was injured, or that defendants were under any obligation to furnish said car, or under any obiiga13. 196 S. W. (2d) 299 (Mo. 1946).
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tion to inspect the floor of said car, or under any obligation to warn plaintiff
or advise him of the condition of the floor of said car." In reversing the
judgment for the railroad company and in reinstating the verdict for the
plaintiff, the supreme court saw no decisive distinction between the supplying of a car as a common carrier for common carrier service and in supplying
the car in the performance of its contractual undertaking, with the consequent duty owed to the plaintiff to exercise due care to ascertain that the
car was reasonably safe for loading, "quite like the legal duty of a carrier to
the employee of a shipper." The railroad company, a party to the tripartite
contract for the mutual benefit of the three parties thereto, contemplated
that cars were necessary to transport ice in the icing and re-icing service;
undertook to transport the loaded cars; set the empty cars for loading and,
in so doing, had the opportunity to inspect the cars and to select the cars
which were reasonably safe for loading; knew the employees of the ice company would be loading the cars; and knew that those employees would be
subject to danger if the cars were not reasonably safe for loading.14
5. Employer-Employee Relationship
In Foster v. Campbell,15 the action was for injuries received by the
plaintiff, a minor, when the motorcycle on which he and another boy were
riding was involved in a collision with a pick-up truck driven by the defendant's wife. The action was brought against both the defendant and his wife,
the liability of the defendant being predicated on the theory that the wife
of the defendant was, at the time of the collision, operating the truck as the
"agent, servant and employee" of the defendant, and was acting within the
course and scope of her employment and in the performance of her duties as
such servant and agent. The trial court had sustained at the close of the
plaintiff's evidence a separate motion for a directed verdict as to the defend14. The question of the proper order to be made in disposing of the case

confronted the court-whether the cause should be remanded for a new trial, or
whether the verdict should be reinstated and judgment entered for the plaintiff.
The theory of the plaintiff's action was the duty to exercise due care arising out of
the relation of common carrier and shipper, nevertheless the defendant's duty to
exercise due care was the same although the duty arose out of the tripartite contract. The court said that sufficient facts were alleged in the petition, introduced
into evidence, and submitted by instructions upon which to base the duty to exercise due care. The defendant was accorded its defenses upon these issues. The
court concluded that "no good reason, in the interest of justice, occurs to us for
another trial of the cause." The judgment for the railroad company was reversed
and cause remanded with directions to reinstate the verdict, and to render judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the verdict.
15. 196 S. W. (2d) 147 (1946).
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ant, apparently because of the insufficiency of the evidence of agency. The
plaintiff appealed on the ground that he made a submissible case upon the
mere proof of the husband's ownership of the pick-up pruck at the time of

.the collision. The evidence showed that the wife with her husband's permission drove the truck to town tomarket poultry produce which she handled
separately from the business of farming, and at the husband's request had

purchased gasoline for use in the tractor and about the general business of
farming. Before going to town the wife had driven the husband back to
work in a field, where he filled his tractor from the barrel that was in the

truck, and then he requested that she go to a certain filling station and have
the barrel filled with gasoline. The supreme court reversed the trial court and
remanded the case, as it could not be said that the evidence showed as a

matter of law that the trip was solely upon the wife's separate business. "If
the trip was for the mixed or double purpose of her business and the business

of her husband as well, and there was no material deviation from those purposes, it may not be said that she was not engaged upon her husband's business when she was returning home, after having sold her produce and pur-

chased feed, with the gasoline which she had purchased at his request." The
court quoted from the Restatement of Agem-y: "An act may be within the
scope of employment, although done in part to serve the purposes of the
servant or of a third person.... The fact that the predominant motive of
the servant is to benefit himself or a third person does not prevent the act
from being within the scope of employment."' 6 Under this view it was not
necessary to decide whether the plaintiff was entitled to have the husband's
liability submitted upon the mere fact of the nature of the vehicle and the

husband's ownership of it.17
16. Section 236 and comment pp. 530, 531.
17. In State ex rel. Massman v. Bland, 194 S. W. (2d) 42 (Mo. 1946), on
certiorari to review a judgment affirming a judgment rendered on a jury's verdict for
the plaintiff, the supreme court quashed the opinion of the Kansas City Court of
Appeals and reversed the circuit court's judgment for the plaintiff for personal
injuries sustained while operating a sorghum mill. The theory of the plaintiff's
action was that he was injured while working as an employee of the defendant,
having been employed by the operator of a nearby farm owned by the defendant.
The operator had leased the farm on which the sorghum mill was located and
at the same time operated the defendant's nearby farm as his agent. The court
reviewed the evidence and concluded that it was insufficient to take to the jury
the question whether the defendant expressly or impliedly authorized his agent,
in the operation of the defendant's farm, to employ the plaintiff who was injured
while operating the sorghum mill on another farm which had been leased by such
agent for his own purposes. The decision affords an interesting review of the evidence on which the plaintiff tried to make out a case of agency which could not
be established by direct and positive evidence.
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B. Res ipsa loquitur
In two cases the plaintiff predicated a verdict against the defendants
on general negligence, and on appeal the defendants contended that the
plaintiffs waived all rights to go to the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, or a general negligence submission, because the plaintiff's evidence
clearly established the precise cause of the accident and the injuries complained of. In Semler v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,18 the action was
for injuries sustained by the plaintiff, while on one of the defendant's streetcars, and caused by a violent stop of the streetcar as the plaintiff was approaching an empty seat. When he was about a step from this seat the streetcar, which had started, made a sudden and violent stop, throwing the plaintiff backward and causing his left leg to drop from the body of the car into
its vestibule, and causing the plaintiff to fall backward to the floor of the
vestibule with his left leg locked around a stanchion in the streetcar. The
plaintiff's evidence established that the occasion for the motorman making
the sudden stop was the operation of an automobile across the path and immediately in front of the streetcar at a high rate of speed. "But the plaintiff did not go further," held the court in affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, "and attempt to prove the specific negligent act of defendant (such as
a failure to maintain a proper lookout or reversing the car instead of applying an emergency brake), in causing the streetcar to come to such a sudden
and violent stop as to throw plaintiff backwards as described in the evidence."
The plaintiff "does not lose the benefit of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine by introducing some evidence of the defendant's negligence where it falls short of
establishing the specific and precise negligence causing the injury."
The same reasoning was applied in Stephens v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,:9 in an action for injuries sustained in an explosion occuring in
the basement of the defendant's office building. The plaintiff offered evidence concerning a break in a gas main under the adjoining street and the
invasion of the premises by natural gas from without the building. The plaintiff's evidence showed that the defendant, being in possession and control of
the building, should have discovered and stopped the entrance of gas into
the premises from any source. Considered as a whole, the court held that
the evidence "did not show the cause of the explosion with such certainty
and definiteness as to require a submission of the cause on specific negligence.. . ." The real cause of the explosion remained in doubt. Whether
18. 196 S.W. (2d) 197 (1946).
19. 191 S. W. (2d) 601 (1946).
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the gas came from the house pipes, the gas main or from some other source,
whether the leaks in the house pipes or the break in the gas main, or both,
existed before the explosion, and whether sewer gas could have entered the
building were all questions of fact to be found by the jury. Therefore, the
giving of the defendant's instructions, limiting plaintiff's recovery to the
specific negligence mentioned in the defendant's instructions (failure to discover that the gas had seeped into the building in explosive quantities and
in time to have remedied that condition), was prejudicial error in that they
conflicted with the plaintiff's instruction under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, which authorized a recovery if the defendant was in control of the
building when the explosion occurred and without requiring proof of previous notice of the gas within the building, and limited the plaintiff's right
of recovery under that doctrine.
When the plaintiff offers sufficient evidence of the accident and the surrounding circumstances from which negligence may be inferred, so as to
place himself within the res ipsa doctrine, and the defendant offers no evidence to disprdve negligence on its part, whether the jury 'may or nust fiind
the defendant liable has not been too clear in the Missouri decisions. The
court, in Duncan v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 20 clarifies this situation by
quoting with approval from a United States Supreme Court decision in the
case of Sweeney v. Erving2l as follows: "Res ipsa loquitur means that the
facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they
compel such an inference; that they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where direct evidence of it may be lacking, but it is evidence to be
weighed, not necessarily to be accepted as sufficient; that they call for explanation or rebuttal, not necessarily that they require it; that they make a
case to be decided by the jury, not they forestall the verdict."
C. Imputed negligence
The most interesting case in the field of torts during the year under review and one which, had the decision in the Kansas City Court of Appeals
affirming a judgment for the plaintiff not been reversed, would have sug22
gested far reaching consequences is that of State ex rel. McCrory v. Bland.
20. 197 S. W. (2d) 964 (1946).
21. 228 U. S. 233 (1913), first quoted by Judge Ragland in a concurring
opinion in McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 46 S. W. (2d) 557 (1932), and
again receiving the approval of a majority of the court in Harke v. Haase, 335 Mo.
1104, 75 S. W. (2d) 1001 (1934). An exhaustive treatment of "res ipsa loquitur"
as a presumption or a mere permissible inference is found in 53 A. L. R. 1494 (1928).
22. 197 S. W. (2d) 669 (1946).
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The plaintiff was a laundress in the home of the defendants, husband and
wife, and, although engaged by the wife, was employed in the operation and
maintenance of the home, the wife managing the operation and the husband
furnishing the funds therefor. Due to the negligence of the wife in leaving a
mop handle protruding across a poorly lighted part of a basement stairway,
plaintiff was injured by falling to the bottom of these steps and into a post
situated nearby. The court of appeals, in affirming the judgment of the
trial court for the plaintiff, found that the husband remained accountable
for any torts of his wife committed within the scope of a "joint undertaking"
with her, that the maintenance and operation of the home was such a jointundertaking, and that the nature of the marital relationship itself was not
such as to exempt its participants from the legal liabilities attendant thereto.
The defendant appellant in the court of appeals contended that, by virtue
of Section 3680 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, 1939, a husband was not
liable for the torts of his wife unless he would have been responsible therefor
irrespective'of the marital relation, and should not have been found liable for
this negligent act not committed in his presence or upon his direction. The
issue involved was whether a "home" is to be considered a joint enterprise
of its makers in which substantive tort law will impute to one party the negligence, and consequent liability, of the other for acts occurring within the
23
scope of that enterprise.
Since the opinions in the intermediate court and in the supreme court
have received careful analysis elsewhere in the Review, 2' only the basis of
the decision in the latter court will be stated here. The court held, since the
maintenance of a home by a husband and wife was the result of their marital status, a duty owed by the husband to the wife under the law, there could
be no joint adventure because a joint adventure arises only by contract or
agreement between the parties. Assuming the court's premise that the maintenance of the home arises out of the marital status and not by contract,
there still remains a basis for imputing the negligence to another on a theory
of joint enterprise which may or may not be based on contract. Do these
two theories for liability necessarily coincide in extent? The instant case
seems to hold that they do. The result of the decision gives protection to
family property held by the tenancy by the entirety, and perhaps prevents
23. The provocative opinion by the Kansas City Court of Appeals is reported
in 192 S. W. (2d) 431 (1946).
24. For the analysis of the opinion in the couirt of appeals see (1946) 11 Mo.
LAW REv. 327. For the analysis of the opinion in the supreme court see (1947)
12 Mo. LAw REv. 231.
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the possibility of an opening in support of the family automobile doctrine
which has not been approved in Missouri.
D. Defense in negligence cases
In Williamson v. Wabas. Railroad Co.,2 5 the action was under the Fed-

eral Employers' Liability Act to recover for injuries received by the plaintiff, who was the head brakeman of the crew of the defendant's freight train,
as a result of a collision of two trains operated by the defendant. The theory
of the defense was that the plaintiff was precluded from recovering for violating a railroad rule directing trainmen to be prepared, in case of emergency,
to act in any capacity to insure safety, and to remind their conductors or
enginemen of the contents of train orders. The evidence showed that a train
order had been issued to the crew of the freight train, to the effect that it
should stop at Jameson if it could not reach Gallatin in time to clear a passenger train by 2:10 A.M., or five minutes before the passenger train was
due to leave Gallatin. When the engineer did not slow down at Jameson, the
plaintiff, who was riding in the engine in the brakeman's seat, which is ahead
of the fireman's seat, said to the engineer "John, we can't make it." The
engineer replied, "I've got plenty of time." After the above statements between the engineer and the plaintiff nothing further was said between them
until plaintiff called, "Headlight." The defendant contended that, under the
railroad rule and the existing circumstances, if the plaintiff could not have
persuaded the engineer to stop the train, he should have acted in any capacity to have stopped the train as required by the rule and should have set tne
air brake to stop the train. The court held that the rule did not mean that a
subordinate employee should by force take over the duties of a superior employee; instead, it is obvious that the rule is meant to apply where an employee is incapacitated to perform his duties due to sickness, death or other
reasons, in which event the next lower employee should step in and take over
the incapacitated employee's duties. When the plaintiff reminded the engineer of the contents of the train order and the engineer indicated that he
understood, the plaintiff had performed his duty under the rule.
The principle that "a failure on the part of the plaintiff, where a duty
to look exists, to see what is plainly visible when he looks, constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law," was applied in Kobusch v. Raberoid Co.28 That was an action for damages for the wrongful death of the
25. 196 S. W. (2d) 129 (Mo. 1946).
26. 194 S. W. (2d) 911 (Mo. 1946).
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plaintiff's husband resulting from injuries received when he was struck by a
crane operated by an employee of the defendant. The deceased was working for a painting contractor in painting the interior of the defendant's plant.
He had been working there for four or five weeks and was familiar with the
operation of the crane on the raised platform about the floor of the plant.
He had been painting beams above the platform and was descending to get
needed materials. To descend from the platform it was necessary for him
to step across one of the rails upon which the electric crane operated and
climb down a stationary ladder. Just as he had one foot on the ladder and
one foot on the platform he was struck by the crane. From this position the
evidence showed that he could see in all directions, that there was nothing
to obstruct his view of the crane, and that he was fully aware that the crane
did operate along there and might operate along there at any time.
In Young v. City of Farmington,27 whether a motorcycle operator was
contributorily negligent in not warning the driver of a truck, approaching
from the opposite direction and making a left hand turn from the extreme
right hand of lane of a four-lane highway, of motorcycle's approach, though
motorcyclist knew the driver of the truck was looking at him, and in making no effort to avoid a collision until five or six feet from the truck was held
for the jury. The driver of the truck gave no signal of an intention to turn
from the four-lane highway into an intersecting street. The plaintiff thought
the driver was merely moving from the outer to the inner lane for traffic
headed in the same direction. The evidence showed a steady turning movement of the truck to the point of the collision which was 8 or 10 feet on the
plaintiff's side of the center line of the four-lane highway. The plaintiff testified that he did not realize there was going to be a collision until he was
within 5 to 10 feet of the truck when he put on his brake and turned to the
right.
E. Burden of Proof
An interesting question was presented in Duncan v. St. Louis Public
Service Co., 28 which was an action for personal injuries sustained by the
plaintiff when she was thrown down as a result of a collision between two of
the defendant's streetcars, on one of which plaintiff was a passenger. The
plaintiff's case was based upon the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. At the plaintiff's request the trial court had instructed the jury to the effect that the de27. 196 S. W. (2d) 124 (Mo. 1946).
28. 197 S. W. (2d) 964 (Mo. 1946).
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fendant, as a common carrier for hire, was under a duty to exercise the highest degree of care and, if they found from the evidence that there was a collision and that the plaintiff was injured thereby, such facts were sufficient
circumstantial evidence to warrant a finding of negligence on the part of the
defendant. For the defendant the court gave an instruction on the burden
of proof which, because of the contention by the plaintiff as it may affect a
res ipsa case, is set forth in full as follows: "The court instructs the jury
that the charge laid by the plaintiff against the defendant in this case is one
of negligence. Recovery may not be had on a charge of negligence except
when such charge is sustained by the preponderance, that is, the greater
weight of the credible evidence. By the term 'preponderance or greater
weight of the credible evidence' as used in this instruction is meant evidence
which is more convincing to you as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto by the defendant. It does not devolve upon the
defendant to disprove said charge, but rather the law casts the burden of
proof in reference to said charge upon the plaintiff, and said charge of negligence must be sustained by the preponderance, that is, the greater weight
of the credible evidence. If, therefore, you find the evidence touching the
charge of negligence against the defendant does not preponderate in favor
of the plaintiff, or is evenly balanced, then and in that case plaintiff is not
entitled to recover against the defendant and you will find your verdict for
the defendant." Before the instructions were read to the jury, the plaintiff
objected to the giving of this instruction, on the ground that, under the instruction given for the plaintiff on the res ipsa theory, the burden of bringing forward evidence to rebut the inference of negligence was on the defendant; therefore, the instruction given for the defendant was wrong because it
threw the burden of proof on the plaintiff, and, the burden of going forward
with the evidence after a prima facie case has been made having shifted to
the defendant, this instruction permitted the defendant to escape such duty.
In other words, since the plaintiff is entitled to an inference of negligence
from circumstantial evidence without carrying the burden of proving any
specific negligence, an instruction relieving the defendant of the duty to disprove might well be understood as throwing a duty to prove specific negligence upon the plaintiff, and thus deprive the plaintiff of the legitimate inferences to which she might be entitled. The court did not agree with this
contention as precluding the jury from indulging an inference of the defendant's negligence upon evidence by the plaintiff of the situation mentioned in
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her instruction. The two instructions were not inconsistent and, when read
together, did not have the effect of misleading the jury to believe they were
required to find the defendant guilty of specific negligence.
II. LIBEL

In Coats v. News Corporatio, 29 in an action for libel, the question for
the court, in ruling on a request for a directed verdict, was whether the article was capable of being reasonably understood to apply to the plaintiff.
In publishing news stories relative to the criminal career of Charles C. Coats,
the defendant referred to him as a former ticket agent for the old interurban
company in that city. The name of the former ticket agent was Willis R.
Coats. The defendant did not intend to refer to the plaintiff, the correct
name was used, the correct picture was printed, only in the description of
his former occupation was there an inaccuracy. However, the names were
idem sonans and, to a certain extent, there was a visual identity in print. In
ruling against the defendant, the court held that a person knowing only the
plaintiff's name, and not knowing his present location, but knowing that he
formerly sold tickets at the interurban station designated in the article,
could reasonably, although mistakenly, have understood that the article referred to the plaintiff as the criminal and was for the jury. A verdict for one
dollar was affirmed. The mistake had been promptly admitted and promptly
corrected by publishing explanatory articles, with the plaintiff's picture. The
apology was given more prominence and circulation than the original publication. Those persons who knew the plaiitiff as a former ticket agent, and
who testified as witnesses, said they had soon found out that the plaintiff
was not the person meant by the article. It had no effect on the plaintiff's
employment, his compensation having more than doubled before the trial.
Therefore, the jury's verdict, awarding only nominal damages, was not so
"unconscionable as to impress the court with its injustice, and thereby induce
the court to believe that the jury were actuated by prejudice, partiality, or
corruption .... " The refusal by the trial judge to grant a new trial on the
ground of the inadequacy of the damages was upheld.

29. 197 S. W. (2d) 958 (Mo. 1946), noted in (1947) 12 Mo. LAw REV. 365,
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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND PROBATE ADMINISTRATION
GEORGE W. SnKINs*

Although usually cases involving the construction of wills and trusts
are not of general interest, the most important decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court in 1946 in the field of this article were cases involving novel
questions of construction.
CASES ON CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS AND TRUSTS

The case of Lyter v. Vestal' involved the construction of an "encroachment" clause in a trust created by will. The trustees were granted the power
to encroach "in the exercise of their discretion and upon the written request
of my wife in the event of any emergency, which in the discretion of the
Trustees exist" so as to provide for the maintenance, comfort and general
welfare of the beneficiaries. The trustees were in doubt as to their powers
and, accordingly, this suit for a declaratory judgment was brought. The
court holds that under the language above quoted encroachment is to be allowed only in those instances in which an emergency exists, and the court
stresses that an emergency does not exist in connection with a power such
as here given unless the situation is urgent indeed, saying:
"The word 'emergency' is not construed as a temporary unavailability of resources to meet a need, which need would in the
judgment of the trustees, in reasonable probability be satisfied, in
course, by the widow's resources including her income from the
trust estate. The word 'emergency' is thus construed to the word's
full import of meaning, that is, to the full import of the necessity,
urgency and immediacy implicit in the meaning of the word."
This narrow construction of the encroachment clause and the strong indication of the court's view, that in determining whether or not discretion
should be exercised and the extent to which it should be exercised the trustees must consider not only the immediate questions but the long run effects
of diminishing the corpus of the trust estate, should be borne in mind by all
lawyers drafting wills. It is to be feared that this interpretation is probably
contrary to the thinking back of the inclusion of encroachment clauses. It
may be advantageous in wills hereafter drawn to specify that the income
beneficiaries are to be considered the primary objects of the testator's bounty.
In Brookittgs v. Mississippi Valley Trust Company the supreme court
*Attorney, St. Louis. A.B., Harvard, 1930; J.D., Washington University, 1933.
1. 196 S.W. (2d) 769 (Mo. 1946).
2. 196 S. W. (2d) 775 (Mo. 1946).
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held that where a will directed that the trustee shall first pay "all taxes, insurance, repairs and other charges and expenses" (emphasis the court's)
and then pay over the balance to the income beneficiaries, there was no field
for the operation of the doctrine of deducting the expense of carrying unproductive property from the corpus of the trust rather than from the income payable to the income beneficiary.
VALIDITY OF WILLS, TRUSTS AND SIMILAR INSTRUMENTS

In only one case during the year 1946 was the court called on to pass
upon the sufficiency of evidence in a will contest case. In Pickett v. Cooper8
the court upheld a ruling, based on medical and lay testimony, that the testator was mentally incompetent to execute a will when he executed the purported will.
In Young v. Pressgrove4 the court held that where trustees under an indenture of trust brought suit to quiet title, defendants could allege in a crossbill that the grantor in the trust was in fact insane and the trust accordingly void. The grantor was brought in by service of summons on this crossbill and the court held the trust void. This procedure was held proper by the
court, appeal having been taken on the record alone. It was further held
that an attorney originally employed by one of defendants who became convinced of the insanity of the grantor of the trust could properly act as attorney for the guardian of the grantor in urging the invalidity of the trust
and was entitled to be allowed attorney's fees out of the corpus of the property for such services to the guardian.
The well settled principles of law as to the legal test of the sufficiency
of evidence in a suit for specific performance of a contract to devise were
again applied in Schebaum v. Mersman,5 the court finding the evidence insufficient and reversing a decree of specific performance but permitting plaintiff to amend her petition to seek recovery for services rendered and not exceeding indebtedness of the deceased to her.
A similar result was reached on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
to establish the creation of a trust as to money found in the possession of a
deceased, allegedly held in trust for the benefit of a relative.0
In Potts v. Patterson'the court reiterated the legal principles governing
3. 192 S.W. (2d) 412 (Mo. 1946).

4. 195 S. W. (2d) 516 (Mo. 1946).

5. 191 S. W. (2d) 671 (Mo. 1946).
6. Maguire v. Wander, 193 S. W. (2d) 900 (Mo. 1946).
7. 195 S. W. (2d) 454 (Mo. 1946).
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the delivery of a deed in escrow and upheld a deed which was not to be delivered until after the death of grantor and his wife.
In the two cases of Odom v LangstoiO testator had, prior to his death,
created a trust. Plaintiffs were dissatisfied with both the will and the trust
and had brought prior unsuccessful litigation to contest the validity of the
will.9 After a retrial of that suit plaintiffs again appealed to the supreme
court but had dismissed their appeal. In the first case it was held that an
action by heirs at law to have a residuary clause of a will declared void is
not a suit to construe a will but is subject to the five year statute of limititions if personal property is involved or the ten year statute of limitations
if real property is involved. The court further held that under the doctrine
of equitable conversion the five year statute was applicable, even though
testator at the time of his death owned real property, where the will authorized the executors "with all convenient speed, after my demise, to convert
my estate, both real and personal, into cash." In the second case plaintiff
sought a declaratory judgment that a trust instrument was void. The court
declined to put the case upon the ground that plaintiffs had no legal standing to attack the trust because they had been unsuccessful in attacking the
residuary clause of the will which cut them out. The court preferred to put
its opinion upon the ground that the will did not violate the Rule against
Perpetuities and created a valid charitable trust which was not too indefinite
in that the trustees named for the erection or creation of a monument to be
known as the Samuel J. Langston and Barsha A. Langston Memorial had
discretion to create a memorial of such character that it would be a public
charity.
The very troublesome question of the relationship of trustee and beneficiary was before the court in two cases. In the first of these (Kdrn. v.
Zepp,'10 the court found upon a review of disputed testimony that the trustees had borne the burden of proof of showing absolute fairness in connection with the purchase of the corpus of the trust (a house) from the beneficiaries. In the second case (Koplar v. Rossett), 11 the court concluded that
the opposition of voting trustees and a corporate trustee under a mortgage
to a proposed plan of reorganization of an apartment building in St. Louis
8.
9.
10.
11.

195 S.W. (2d) 463 (Mo. 1946), 195 S. W. (2d) 465 (Mo. 1946).
Odom v. Langston, 347 Mo. 1201, 152 S. W. (2d) 124 (Mo. 1941).
196 S. W. (2d) 249 (Mo. 1946).
196 S.W. (2d) 800 (Mo. 1946).
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was motivated by the selfish interest of one of the voting trustees and the
corporate trustee and, accordingly, the court affirmed a decree removing the
voting trustees and said corporate trustee under the- mortgage.
OLD FRIENDS

As is usual, there reappeared before the Supreme Court of Missouri further litigation in conection with estates which have filled the court reports
for many years. There seems no surer way to insure years of profitable business for lawyers than for serious litigation to start about a large estate. In
one of the instances the decision went off on points primarily affecting the
subject matter of this article, while the other involved a question of probate
procedure.
Moffett v. Commerce Trust Company12 holds a petition demurrable
where it attempts to state a joint cause of action in favor of a widow as an
individual and as an executrix, regardless of whether a cause of action was
stated in favor of the plaintiff in either separate capacity. This case involved
further litigation of an estate three times before the Superior Court of Kansas, once before the Supreme Court of Missouri, twice before the Supreme
Court of the United States, and once before the federal district court and the
circuit court of appeals.
The final old friend is another appeal in the Tkomasson,Estate,"" where
the court disallowed the claim of R. Shad Bennett for alleged advances made
and for services rendered, on the ground that such advances and services
were not for the benefit of the decedent. The decision holds that, as a matter of procedure in the probate court, formal pleading even of defenses is
not necessary unless they consitute set-offs, counterclaims or other cross demands, which cross demands must be pleaded in writing.

12.
13.

193 S. W. (2d) 588 (Mo. 1946).
196 S. W. (2d) 155 (Mo. 1946).
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THE NEW GENERAL CODE FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND SUPREME COURT RULES INTERPRETED'
CARL C. WHEATON*
CASES COVERED BY THE CODE

Our new General Code for Civil Procedure went into effect on January
1, 1945. In general it governs all proceedings in civil actions brought after
its effective date, and also further proceedings in all actions then pending,
except to the extent that, in the opinion of the court, its application in a
particular action pending when the new code became effective would not
be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure
2

applies.
The provisions in the civil code that it governs pending proceedings and
proceedings instituted after the effective date of the code are not applicable
to proceedings wherein the procedure is otherwise governed by law. Hence,
the appellate provisions of the new code do not apply to appeals from the
circuit court to courts of appeals in social security cases, as the statute prescribing the manner of such an appeal was not specifically or impliedly repealed by the provisions of that code. 8 "Unless otherwise provided" was
included in Section 2 of the code to preserve special methods of procedure
4
such as are found in the Social Security Act.
TERM ABOLISHED

For procedural purposes, terms of court are abolished by the new civil
code.5
PARTIES

a. Joinder of
Where different persons sustain personal injuries and property damages
in an automobile collision through the negligence of another, they may join
in one action, and separate counts are unnecessary. So, where persons involved in the same automobile collision filed a petition with but one count
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri, A.B., 1911, Leland Stanford University, LL.B., 1915, Harvard University. Draftsman for the Missouri Supreme
Court Committee on Civil Practice and Procedure.
1. This interpretation is based on cases in Volumes 196 through 201 of Southwestern Reporter, Second Series.
2. Hannibal v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 200 S. W. (2d) 568 (Mo. App.
1947).
3. Rosebraugh v. State Social Security Commission, 196 S. W. (2d) 27 (Mo.
App. 1946).

4. Ibid.

5. Wooten v. Friedberg, 198 S. W. (2d) 1 (Mo. 1946).
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wherein it was alleged that the defendant was guilty of different acts of negligence and prayed for judgment for personal injuries and property damages
in specified amounts in favor of respective plaintiffs, the verdict for different
plaintiffs in specified amounts was responsive to the pleadings and deter-mined all the issues as to all parties. 6
b. Misjoinder of
Section 17 of the civil code provides that misjoinder of parties is not a
ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order
of the trial court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage
7
of the action and on such terms as are just.
c. Class Suits
1. Living Persons not Joined
In a statutory class suit where there are or may be living persons, known
or unknown, not made parties, it is necessary to state that fact and further
allege and prove the reason for their omission and that their interests are
properly represented by parties to the suit."
2. Stockholder's Actions
The civil code rule that a stockholder cannot complain of alleged mismanagement occurring prior to his acquisition of the stock is not applicable
where the acts of irregularity continue after the acquisition of the stock.,
d. Substitution of
Where the plaintiff died while an appeal was pending and a suggestion
of the plaintiff's death in a motion to substitute his administratrix was not
filed until more than a year thereafter, the court of appeals no longer had
jurisdiction to proceed with the case on its merits and it was therefore required to dismiss the appeal as to the deceased plaintiff, since any action
that it would take in the cause would be void.
The filing of a motion by the administratrix and the heirs of the deceased
plaintiff to dismiss the appeal as to the plaintiff, because there was no timely
substitution of the plaintiff's successors or representatives, was not an appearance by the administratrix and heirs which waived substitution of
parties and gave the court of appeals jurisdiction to proceed with the cause
on the merits, since the failure to substitute cannot be waived.1o
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

'Th'orn v. Cross, 201 S. W. (2d) 492 (Mo. App. 1947).
State ex rel. Harwood v. Sartorius, 198 S. W. (2d) 690 (Mo. 1947).
Brown v. Bibb, 201 S. W. (2d) 370 (Mo. 1947).
Koplar v. Rosset, 196 S. W. (2d) 800 (Mo. 1946).
Wormington v. City of Monett, 198 S. W. (2d) 536 (Mo. App. 1946).
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SETTING FORTH CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
It is essential in pleading a claim or cause of action that facts be stated
showing the pleader to be entitled to relief. In ruling the sufficiency of the
facts pleaded to state a claim or cause of action, a court will look to material
and essential allegations which are not made as well as to those made. The
legislature in enacting the new code has not sanctioned "notice pleading"
which, it has been asserted by some, is contemplated by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The legislature considered it more helpful that we should
not ignore or abandon what learning and experience have found to be a plain
statement of the facts (rather than conclusions) constituting a claim or
cause of action,Although the theory is that, since the state alone has the power to incorporate, it may waive irregularities in the strict perfection of corporate
existence, and so long as the state does not see fit to question the legality of
the existence of a corporation, private individuals will not be permitted to
raise an inquiry on their own behalf, this does not mean that where a corporation sues in its corporate name, the defendant may not, by specific negative averment, deny the fact of corporate existence. Such right is in fact
expressly granted by the code, and a denial of this character does not offend
against the rule which makes the legality of corporate existence immune to
attack by private individuals. The denial merely requires the plaintiff to
exhibit the evidence of its authority to exist and function as a corporation,
but does not make it incumbent upon it to prove that its charter or other
evidence of corporate existence was obtained rightfully and properly by following to the letter all the preliminary steps directed by law for its creation.' 2
APPLICATIONIS FOR ORDERS
Section 60 of the General Code for Civil Procedure governs applications
for orders of court made prior to hearing or trial, and is not applicable to a
motion for a directed verdict, which motion now is provided (in lieu of the
former demurrer to the evidence and in lieu of the request for peremptory
instructions) by Section 112 of that code.'
MOTIONS TO DISMISS

In the case of Finck v. Edwards, 4 the motion to dismiss for lack of call.
12.
1947).
13.
14.

Langenberg v. City of St. Louis, 197 S. W. (2d) 621 (Mo. 1946).
Pearson Drainage District v. Erhardt, 201 S. W. (2d) 484 (Mo. App.
Oganaso v. Mellow, 201 S. W. (2d) 365 (Mo. 1947).
198 S. W. (2d) 665 (Mo. App. 1946).
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pacity to sue was based upon the claim that the plaintiffs were no longer
trustees of the trust indenture under which this suit was brought to foreclose
the lien of certain assessments. The fact that the plaintiffs were no longer
trustees did not appear on the face of the petition. The court said: "We do
not think the motion to dismiss was authorized by Section 61 of the code, for
it goes to the merits of the cause rather than to the capacity of the plaintiffs to sue. In other words, the want of capacity to sue depends upon the
termination of the trust, and if the trust was terminated there was then on
defendants' theory no cause of action in plaintiffs as distinguished from no
capacity to sue. The want of capacity to sue arises by showing no cause of
action on the merits, that is, by going into the merits and showing particular provisions of the trust indenture not appearing on the face of the petition.
In our opinion this section was-not intended to serve such a purpose. And
it is obvious, we think, without discussion, that the motion is not authorized
by Section 62, for that section authorizes such a motion only where the failure of the petition to state a claim upon which relief can be granted appears
on the face of the petition. The motion in its nature and effect is nothing
more nor less than what was known under the old practice as a speaking
demurrer."
On the other hand, the supreme court, in speaking of procedure under
Section 61, said, in Hamilton v. Linn;1 "The trial court is authorized to receive proof of matters raised by motion. In this regard the motion also performs the office of a 'speaking' demurrer. This practice is new to this jurisdiction and came with the new civil code. Discussing it prospectively and
before the adoption of the new code this court said in a similar situation
where it was sought to dispose of a case by a motion to dismiss: 'In this kind
of a situation, a speaking demurrer might well be an aid to prompt and efficient administration of justice, resulting in avoidance of expense and delay,
by making it possible to decide at once an issue that would dispose of a law
suit actually barred or groundless on uncontroverted facts; and our new proposed code provides for such a procedural improvement.'
If a party so desires, he may properly raise the defense of res judicata by
a motion to dismiss although it is an affirmative defense and, under Section
40 of the new code, must be affirmatively pleaded, and even though it is a defense that goes to the merits and not to the jurisdiction. Furthermore, res
judicata may be raised by motion although it is not specified in Section 61
15. 200 S. W. (2d) 69 (Mo. 1947).
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in the list of objections which may be so raised. That section expressly allows "other matters" than those specified to be raised by motion. The raising of "other matters" in a motion to dismiss is permissive and not mandatory so such other matters are not waived if not raised by motion but may
be raised for the first time in the answer or other responsive pleading. Section 72 states that all defenses and objections for which there is no provision
for the raising of the same by motion shall be raised in the responsive pleading.

6

WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AVAILABLE BY MOTION
Though the facts constituting a conspiracy and fraud are not pleaded

with particularity as required by Section 47 of the new code, and this portion
of the petition would properly be subject to a motion for a more definite
statement or for a bill or particulars as authorized under Section 63, yet,
under Section 66, defendants are deemed to have waived any such objection
7
by failing to make such motions within the time permitted for them.1
COUNTERCLAIMS

Under the provisions of Section 74, the matter set up in a counterclaim

need not diminish or defeat the plaintiff's recovery and the counterclaimant
may claim relief different in kind from that sought by the opposing party.',
AMENDMENTS TO PLEADINGS

Section 81 of the Civil Code of Procedure provides that leave to amend
pleadings shall be freely given when justice so requires. Amendments to
pleadings before final judgment are not only favored by statute but have
always been favored by the courts, the rule being to allow them rather than
to refuse them, and this is especially true when the amendmnt is offered before trial. It is also the settled law that whether or not, in a given case, an
amendment should be permitted is a matter reposing largely within the
sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion which is to be liberally exer-

cised, and is not to be interfered with on appeal unless palpably and obviously abused.
An amendment does not change the nature of the original action nor
destroy the identity of the original transaction, if the measure of recovery is
the same, and a recovery under either the original petition or the amended
16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18.

McCluskey v. DeLong, 198 S. W. (2d) 673 (Mo. App. 1946).
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petition would bar a recovery under the other petition. For an amendment
not to set forth a different cause of action than that originally stated, it must
unquestionably embody the issues set forth in the original action, which
means that the subject matter must be the same, but it is not in all events
essential that the form, legal theory, or utimate remedy of the two actions
shall be identical. A new cause of action is not necessarily introduced by a
change in the mere form of the action (as from ex delicto to ex contractu),
provided the second action adheres to the transaction originally pleaded,
and does not attempt to set up another cause of controversy, or to state
facts which give rise to a wholly distinct and different legal obligation on
the part of the defendant. The important consideration is whether the gist
of the action is the same in both instances so that the plaintiff's recovery in
the first action would have barred his recovery in the second; and if that is
so, it matters not that the new action may not be the same form, or along
the lines of the same theories, as the old one. So long as the fundamental
facts of the controversy remain the same, it is immaterial that the plaintiff
elects to change his theory or form of action.
That a new cause of action is substituted by an amendment, unless the
same evidence will support it that would have supported the original cause
of action, means that the same evidence will establish the event or transaction declared on as the cause of action in the original petition and in the
amended one; will show the two pleadings are based on the same occurrence.
It does not mean that every detail and every item of the evidence must be
exactly the same, otherwise the right of amendment would be of little use.
If the test is to be simply that the quantum and quality of the evidence
should be precisely the same, then the very purpose of allowing any amendments whatever would be defeated. It is necessary that the character of the
evidence shall be the same so the general identity of the transaction forming
the cause of complaint remains the same. It is not objectionable merely that
more or different incidents are alleged.1
A motion to dismiss should not be sustained with prejudice where the
plaintiff has not been afforded time to amend or to avail himself of procedure
provided by code, if necessary, for ascertaining the actual facts which would
enable him to amend and to state a claim upon which relief could be
20
granted.
19. Brinkman Realty Co. v. Deidesheimer, 201 S. W. (2d) 503 (Mo. App.
1947).
20. Langenberg v. City of St. Louis, 197 S. W. (2d) 621 (Mo. 1946).
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TRIAL OF ISSUES NOT RAISED BY TEE PLEADINGS

If a petition is deficient in form or substance, if the defendant files no
motion for a more definite statement or bill of particulars, and if the issues
raised are tried with the consent of the parties and without objection, such
issues shall be treated as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 21
This doctrine has recently been applied in an action to have the terms
of a joint will declared irrevocable as to the wife upon the death of her husband,22 and in an action for death under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. In the latter case, the defense of assumption of risk was not raised in the
pleadings, but evidence of such assumption was given by one of the plain23
tiff's witnesses.
It has also been decided that where a defendant at a hearing on a motion
to set aside a default judgment against him introduces the judgment without
objection, the motion should be considered as amended to include the irregularities appearing on the face of judgment itself.24 However, it has been
held that, where a petition for a divorce failed to allege the residence of the

plaintiff within the state for one whole year next before filing the petition,
or the commission with the state of the offenses complained of while one
or both of the parties resided therein, the court's jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action was not a triable issue within the statute authorizing the amendment of pleadings to conform to the evidence and pro-

viding that a failure to amend shall not affect the result of the trial of the
issues not raised by the pleadings but tried by the consent of the parties.
The court said that the purpose of the statute relating to the amendment of pleadings to conform to the evidence is to liberalize the allowance
of amendments to include triable issues covered by the evidence without
objection, though not raised by the pleadings, but it does not permit a trial
25
of issues affecting the jurisdiction of the court in such a case.
PRE-TRiAL PROCEDURE

The use of the pre-trial conference, by which a plaintiff may become
advised of the respects in which a petition is insufficient and amend it, is discretionary with the court, as is the reasonableness of time and opportunity
allowed a pleader to avail himself of such procedure.2 6
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Stewart v. Shelton, 201 S. W. (2d) 395 (Mo. 1947).
Ibid.
Ford v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 196 S. W. (2d) 163 (Mo. 1946).
Wooden v. Friedberg, 198 S. W. (2d) I (Mo. 1946).
Gooding v. Gooding, 197 S. W. (2d) 984 (Mo. App. 1946).
Langenberg v. City of St Louis, 197 S. W. (2d) 621 (Mo. App. 1946).
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CONTINUANCES

Counsel Member of General Assembly
The statute authorizing a continuance, where any party, or his attorney
is a member of the general assembly, must be construed in connection with
the statute providing that every application shall' be accompanied by an
affidavit setting forth the facts on which the application is founded, and,
therefore, a continuance should not be granted unless the affidavit states
facts which will support a finding that attendance at the trial is necessary
to a fair and proper trial.27
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY

Section 98 of the General Code for Civil Procedure preserves inviolate
the right of trial by jury as declared by the state constitution or as given
by a state statute. Hence, on appeal, if there is substantial evidence to
support a verdict in a law action, the judges have no right to interfere with
28

the verdict.

DIsMISSALS

Section 101 clearly provides that a dismissal without prejudice permits
the parties to bring another action for the same cause unless the suit is
otherwise barred; 29 but that a dismissal with prejudice "operates as an adjudication upon the merits." Said section further provides that any involuntary dismissal other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, or for improper venue, "shall be with prejudice unless the court in its order for
dismissal shall otherwise specify." This simply means that where a dismissal is involuntary, as distinguished from voluntary, and the court fails
to state that it is "without prejudice," it becomes a dismissal "with prejudice" by operation of the statute. This is so, because the statute plainly
and unequivocally makes it so. In other words, if the trial court wishes to
avoid making a dismissal one "with prejudice," it must enter its order of
dismissal "without prejudice."
It is true that the procedure with respect to dismissal under Section
101 is quite different from what it was under the former general code of
27. Koerper v. Kyger, 197 S. W. (2d) 946 (Mo. 1946). Both Judge Leedy's
and judge Hyde's concurring opinion should be read to get the full import of this
case. Prohibition is a proper remedy to enforce the terms of Section 96 of the General Code for Civil Procedure.
28. Murray v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 201 S. W. (2d) 775 (Mo. App.
1947).
29. State ex rel. Harwood v. Sartorius, 198 S. W. (2d) 690 (Mo. 1946); Hannibal v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 200 S. W. (2d) 568 (Mo. App. 1947).
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civil procedure, and although it might appear to be harsh to those accustomed to thb former procedure, its harsh effects can be completely obviated
by merely observing the plain provisions thereof, in having the court enter
orders of dismissal in accordance with the court's intention.80
Where issues raised by pleadings in a suit were not only actually raised
in a former suit, but evidence was heard thereon and the matters were fully
adjudicated, the judgment and decree in the former suit were res judicata,
notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff in the former suit, after a hearing
before the trial court, dismissed the petition, where a cross-petition by the
defendant remained in the case and supported the judgment and decree.,
CONTENT OF VERDICT

In an action for personal injuries it was not necessary for the verdict
to specify in separate items the various kinds of damage suffered by the
plaintiff. 82
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT

The statute providing for a motion for a directed verdict by a party at
the close of the evidence offered by an opponent authorizes a motion for a directed "judgment."32 Since the adoption of the General Code for Civil Procedure, a motion for a directed verdict is insufficient save and except the
movant "makes known to the court his grounds therefor" in compliance
with Section 122, either in the motion or orally into the record of the trial
court.

84

In testing the sufficiency of the evidence to make out a case submissible
to a jury upon a motion for a directed verdict, a plaintiff's evidence must
be considered true and the plaintiff must be given the benefit of every inference of fact which can be reasonably drawn therefrom. If the evidence
supporting the essential issues of the plaintiff's case is substantial, it is sufficient and the case should be submitted to the jury. But it is a judicial
function to determine whether the evidence is substantial, and, if it is not,
there is nothing for the jury to decide. 85
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Hannibal v. St. Louis Public Service Co., stpra note 29.
Faulkenberry v. Boyd, 201 S. W. (2d) 400 (Mo. 1947).
Thorn v. Cross, 201 S. W. (2d) 492 (Mo. App. 1947).
Pearl v. Interstate Securities Co., 198 S. W. (2d) 867 (Mo. App. 1946).
Oganaso v. Mellow, 201 S. W. (2d) 365 (Mo. 1947).
Nash v. Normandy State Bank, 201 S.W. (2d) 299 (Mo. 1947).
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CASEs TIED WITHouT A JuRY

a. Time within wlich to move to amend a judgment
A motion for the modification of a judgment which is filed more than ten
(10) days after the rendition and entry of a judgment is ineffective to suspend the finality of the judgment. Hence, notice thereafter filed of an appeal
from an order striking such motion from the files must be dismissed." If a
cause is tried without a jury the court, under Section 114 (b) of the new
code, may render the judgment after the day of the trial. However, if a judgment is rendered and entered on that date, the fact that the formal judgment
is not prepared in extenso and spread of record on the judgment record until
later merely results in completing the record of the judgment and does not
extend the time for making a motion37
b. Time for Rendition of Judgment
In a cause tried without a jury judgment may be rendered "at or after
the trial."' s
c. Duties of Appellate Courts
In a case tried upon the facts without a jury, an appellate court is required to review the case upon both the law and the evidence as in suits of
an equitable nature, having in mind that the judgment shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and that due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.
Hence, in such a case, no motion for a new trial is necessary to preserve
for appellate review the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment therein."
Where, from a consideration of the whole record, the appellate court
found that there had been no actual transactions between the parties within
the period of the statute of limitations, which had been pleaded by the defendant as a defense to the plaintiff's action, the upper court held that a finding of the trial court that the plaintiff's account was not barred by the stat40
ute was clearly erroneous.
36. Woods v. Cantrell, 201 S. W. (2d) 311 (Mo. 1947).
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Kuhn v. Zepp, 196 S. W. (2d) 249 (Mo. 1946); Hart v. T. L. Wright
Lumber Co., 196 S. W. (2d) 272 (Mo. 1946); Dell-Wood Tires, Inc. v. Riss & Co.,
198 S. W. (2d) 347 (Mo. App. 1946); Mound City Finance Co. v. Frank, 199
S. W. (2d) 902 (Mo. App. 1947); Seabaugh's Dependents v. Garver Lumber Mfg.
Co., 200 S. W. (2d) 55 (Mo. 1947); In re Duren, 200 S. W. (2d) 343 (Mo. 1947);
Prichard v. National Protective Ins. Co., 200 S.W. (2d) 540 (Mo. App. 1947).
40. Feigenbaum v. Van Raalte, 201 S.W. (2d) 283 (Mo. 1947).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss4/1

84

et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court 1946

1947]

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1946

455

THE GRANTING OF NEW TRiALs

a. Grounds for New Trial
Section 115 of the General Code for Civil Procedure, by reference, incorporated in the code the grounds for new trials provided for in Section
1168 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939.4'
b. On Part of the Issues
The authority.of the trial court to order a new trial on separate and
separable issues is merely permissive, the matter being left in the discretion
42
of the trial court.
MOTION FOR NEw TRIAL
a. Purpose of
The real purpose for filing a motion for a new trial is to obtain relief in
the trial court. It may be properly filed for that purpose in a case decided
43
solely on the pleadings, a record proper case.
b. Necessity for
No motion for a new trial is necessary to preserve for appellate review
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment in a
case tried without a jury, because Section 114(d) of the code provides that
in such cases "the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
judgment may be raised whether or not the question was raised in the trial
court.""

c. Time within whic to Make Motion
A motion for a new trial is required to be filed not later than ten (10)
days after the entry of the judgment to which the motion is addressed. 45
d. WhenJ dgment Entered
In jury trials the judgment must be rendered and entered "as of the day
of the verdict.""6
41. Williamson v. Wabash Railroad Co., 196 S. W. (2d) 129 (Mo. 1946). To
the same effect, see State ex rel. Iannicola v. Flynn, 196 S. W. (2d) 438 (Mo. App.
1946).
42. Blanford v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 199 S. W. (2d) 887 (Mo. App.
1947).
43. Seabaugh's Dependents v. Garver Lumber Mfg. Co., 200 S. W. (2d)
55 (Mo. 1947).
44. Ibid.
45. Boone v. Ledbetter, 200 S.W. (2d) 601 (Mo. App. 1947); Woods v.
Cantrell, 201 S.W. (2d) 311 (Mo. 1947); Huffman v. Meriwether, 201 S.W. (2d)
469 (Mo. App. 1947). This time limit has been applied to a motion to set aside
a default decree. State ex rel. Iannicola v. Flynn, 196 S. W. (2d) 438 (Mo. App.
1946).
46. Woods v. Cantrell, supra note 45.
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e. Finadity of Judgment
A judgment is not final so long as a motion for a new trial is pending and
undetermined4
If a motion for a new trial is timely filed in any cause, the judgment is
not final until the motion for a new trial is "deemed denied" under new code
Section 118, after the lapse of 90 days from the date of filing, or is overruled
prior to the lapse of the 90 days.4 8 This rule applies in workmen's compensation cases as in any other case.4 9
CONTROL OF COURT OVER JUDGMENT

If a timely authorized after-trial motion is not filed in connection with
a judgment, the judgment, under Section 119 of the General Code for Civil
Procedure and Supreme Court Rule, Section 3.24, becomes final at the expiration of thirty (30) days after the entry of such judgment." ° During that
time, however, the court may, of its own initiative, order a new trial, or
amend, correct, or modify the judgment.1
EFFECT OF SECTION 120
Section 120 makes a motion for a new trial a proper motion in every
case, since it abolishes all of the old record proper motions and provides that
the objections which were heretofore made on such motions may be raised in
a motion for a new trial. Hence, a motion for a new trial under the new code
is no longer a motion for raising only what were formerly matters of excep2
tion. On the contrary, it is now a motion which covers the whole record.1
EXCEPTIONS TO RULINGS OF A COURT

The necessity of taking formal exceptions to rulings to courts was
abolished by Section 122 of the General Code for Civil Procedure."
However, it has been held during the past year that one may not successfully appeal on the ground of inconsistent instructions where this objec-

tion was raised for the first time in the appellate court" and that failure to
ask the trial court for a mistrial on the ground that a question of insurance
47. Weller v. Hayes Truck Lines, 197 S. W. (2d) 657 (Mo. 1946).
48. Woods v. Cantrell, supranote 45.
49. Seabaugh's Dependents v. Garver Lumber Mfg. Co., 200 S.W. (2d) 55
(Mo. 1947).
50. State ex rel. Tannicola v. Flynn, 196 S. W. (2d) 438 (Mo. 1946); Wooten
v. Friedberg, 198 S. W. (2d) 1 (Mo. 1946); Seabaugh's Dependents v. Garver
Lumber Mfg. Co., 200 S. W. (2d) 55 (Mo. 1947).
51. Huffman v. Meriwether, 201 S.W. (2d) 469 (Mo. App. 1947).
52. Seabaugh's Dependents v. Garver Lumber Mfg. Co., supra note 50.
53. Ibid.
54. Millaway v. Brown, 197 S.W. (2d) 987 (Mo. App. 1946).
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was prejudically present in the case barred consideration on appeal of the
court's failure to declare a mistrial. 55
123
Several times appellate courts have applied the rule in Section 123 of
the General Code for Civil Procedure and have refused to reverse judgments. 56
REVERSAL OF JUDGMENTS UNDER SECTION

WRITS OF ERROR ABOLISHED
57
Section 125 of the code abolishes writs of error.

APPEAL
a. Grounds for Appeal
1. Statute Necessary
The right of appeal is purely statutory and exists only in cases specified
or reasonably within the statute. An appeal without statutory sanction confers no authority upon an appellate court except to enter an order dismissing
the appeal."" On the other hand, whenever a decision is entered in the trial
court, which the statute has made appealable, there is a potential vesting of
jurisdiction in the appellate court to be exercised if the party aggrieved
wishes to perfect an appeal.5 9
2. Aggrieved Party
Plaintiff's attorney in a divorce action who was discharged by the plaintiff prior to the date on which the cause was set for hearing on the merits
was not an "aggrieved party" to the divorce action and could not appeal
from the amount of the attorney's fees allowed. On the other hand, where a
client, who desires to terminate the services of his attorney and to substitute another in his stead, flies a motion for substitution, has the same set
down for hearing, notifies the attorney, and then has the court ascertain all
that is due and owing to the attorney from his client by reason of attorney's
services, and the court provides for the payment thereof as a condition precedent to the allowance of the order of substitution, the matter becomes a
55. Gildehaus v. Jones, 200 S. W. (2d) 523 (Mo. 1947).
56. Petty v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 198 S. W. (2d) 684 (Mo. 1947);
Bolino v. Ill. Terminal R. Co., 200 S. W. (2d) 352 (Mo. 1947); Crawford v. Byers
Transportation Co., Inc., 201 S. W. (2d) 971 (Mo. 1947).
57. Seabaugh's Dependents v. Garver Lumber Mfg. Co., 200 S. W. (2d) 55
(Mo. 1947).
58. Weller v. Hayes Truck Lines, 197 S. W. (2d) 657 (Mo. 1946); East Park
Dist., etc., Kansas City v. Mansfield, 201 S. W. (2d) 434 (Mo. App. 1947).
59. Weller v. Hayes Truck Lines, supra note 58.
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"special proceeding" between client and attorney, a ruling on which may be
appealed from by an aggrieved attorney.60
3. Judgments and Orders Appealable
An order overruling a new trial is not appealable. That order merely
makes the judgment in the case final and the appeal must be taken from that
judgment.61 The same is true of an order overruling a motion to modify a
judgment under Section 114(c) of the code, or of an order striking from the
8
files motions for a new trial or for modification of a judgment 2
To be final and appealable, a judgment must dispose of all parties and
all issues in the cause.68 A judgment dismissing an employee's appeal from an
award of the Workmen's Compensation Commission which affirmed the
0 4
findings of the referee was "final" and appealable.
The phrase "any special order after final judgment in the cause" refers
to the, orders in special proceedings attacking or aiding the enforcement of
the judgment after it has become final in the action in which it was rendered.
One has no right of appeal from an order overruling a motion for a jury trial
on the ground that such order was a special order after final judgment in
the cause.6 5

b. How Taken
1. Interpretation of Statutes
The provisions in the civil code fixing the manner and procedure to be
followed in making an appeal, unless otherwise provided by law, must be considered together and must be interpreted as intended by the legislature.10
2. Notice of Appeal
The vital step for perfecting an appeal is the timely filing of a notice of
appeal under Section 129 with the clerk of the trial court. Thereupon the
appeal becomes "effective." The filing of a notice is the only requirement
necessary to invoke appellate jurisdiction. By the same section it is provided
60. Kaltwasser v. Kaltwasser, 197 S. W. (2d) 102 (Mo. App. 1946).
61. Connoley v. Beyer Crushed Rock Co., 197 S. W. (2d) 653 (Mo. 1946);
Weller v. Hayes Truck Lines, 197 S. W. (2d) 657 (Mo. 1946); Severs v. Williamson,
198 S. W. (2d) 368 (Mo. App. 1946); Lieffring v. Birt, 200 S. W. (2d) 606 (Mo.
App. 1947); Woods v. Cantrell, 201 S. W. (2d) 311 (Mo. 1947).
62. Woods v. Cantrell, supra note 61.
63. Severs v. Williamson, supra note 61.
64. Graves v. 0. F. Elliott, Inc., 197 S. W. (2d) 977 (Mo. 1946).
65. East Park Dist., etc., Kansas City v. Mansfield, 201 S. W. (2d) 434
(Mo. App. 1947).
66. Rosebraugh v. State Social Security Commission, 196 S. W. (2d) 27
(Mo. App. 1946).
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that "after a timely filing of such notice of appeal, failure of the appellant to
take any of the further steps to secure the review of the judgment or order
appealed from does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground for
such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include
dismissal of the appeal." Here again we have another attempt to liberalize
67
the judicial view of technical errors.
The filing of a notice of appeal fifteen (15) days after ninety (90) days
have passed since the filing of a motion for a new trial is too late, as the motion was automatically denied and the judgment became final at the end of the
ninety days. This is so, though the court did not overrule the motion until
68
ninety five (95) days after it was filed.
Technical adherence to required formal averments of notice of appeal
is not jurisdictional, but averments of notice should be liberally construed
to permit appellate review so long as the opposing party is not misled to his
irreparable harm.6 9 The intent of the new code demands that the rule should
be that a notice of appeal can reasonably be construed as an attempt in good
faith to appeal from a final judgment or appealable order shall be deemed
70

sufficient.

This doctrine has been applied recently to a notice of appeal in which
the appellant literally appealed from an order overruling a motion for a new
72
trial,7 1 and to a notice improperly describing the judgment appealed from.
In the notice of appeal Section 131 requires three averments. The notice shall (1) specify the parties taking the appeal; (2) designate the judgment or order appealed from; and (3) name the court to which the appeal
is taken. 73
3. Transcript of the Record
The approval of the trial judge to the transcript under Section 135 is
required only when the parties fail to agree,7 4 but is always required to the
"statement of the case" prepared under Section 136 of the code. It is the
duty of the appellant to procure the approval of the respondents or of the
67. Weller v. Hayes Truck Lines, 197 S. W. (2d) 657 (Mo. 1946).
68. Woods v. Cantrell, 201 S. W. (2d) 311 (Mo. 1947).
69. Weller v. Hayes Truck Lines, supra note 67.
70. Ibid. Also see Woods v. Cantrell, supra note 68, to the same effect.
71. Weller v. Hayes Truck Lines, supra note 67.
72. Connoley v. Beyer Crushed Rock Co., 197 S. W. (2d) 653 (Mo. 1946).
73. Weller v. Hayes Truck Lines, supra note 67.
74. Connoley v. Beyer Crushed Rock Co., 197 S. W. (2d) 653 (Mo. 1946);
Gildehaus v. Jones, 200 S. W. (2d) 523 (Mo. 1947).
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trial judge to the transcript and timely file it with the clerk, not with the
75
official reporter.
A transcript of the record as originally prepared by the reporter which
is authenticated by a certificate signed by the trial judge, and transmitted to
this court under the seal of the clerk of the trial court, is to be considered
true and quite as if the parties had agreed to it. The trial judge's authentication of the full transcript of the record should be considered the act of the
trial judge as a judge and in the exercise of a judicial power, his action to be
dependent on his memory and existing aids. In the authentication of the full
transcript, the trial judge acts under the solemnity of his official oath, and
it will be presumed that he has faithfully and honestly performed his duty. 0
As to the timely filing of the transcript in the appellate court, it has been
held that a day's delay in filing should not be fatal, where the respondent
was given a copy of the transcript before the date required for filing and
where there was no showing that the delay prejudiced the respondent. 7
Although courts of appeals have at times interpreted Sections 135 and 136
of the code strictly and have held that the transcript must contain a copy of
the judgment appealed from,78 and that, where the respondent consistently
refused to agree to a partial or abbreviated transcript, his motion to dismiss
the appeal must be sustained 7 the supreme court has been more liberal in
T

its interpretation of the necessary contents of transcripts.

Thus, it held that although the transcript of a record, as filed by the
plaintiff-appellant, does not contain a copy of the judgment, if it contains
a copy of the notice of appeal, and is properly certified to by the clerk of the
circuit court as being a copy of the original transcript of the record filed in
this cause in said court, if the appellate court has in its files the separate notice of appeal that was filed in the circuit court and appellate courts, if from
said notice of appeal it is shown that plaintiff appeals to the appellate court

from the judgment against him and in favor of the defendant, and if the
court also finds from the transcript of the record that there was a trial of the
cause, that witnesses appeared and were examined, and that a verdict in

favor of defendant was returned and filed under the direction of the court,
the court is justified in exercising the power given to appellate courts by
75. Connoley v. Beyer Crushed Rock Co., supra note 74.
76. Gildehaus v. Jones, supra note 74.
77. Connoley v. Beyer Crushed Rock Co., spra note 74.

78. Lieffring v. Birt, 200 S. W. (2d) 606 (Mo. App. 1947).

79. Kissack v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 198 S. W. (2d) 400 (Mo. App.

1946).
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Supreme Court Rule 1.03, and, acting thereunder, it may require the clerk
of the circuit court to certify up to it a copy of the judgment entered in the
cause in that court. Such action by the appellate court under said Rule 1.03
is calculated to prevent the dismissal of causes in the appellate courts on
mere irregularities or slip-ups in procedure caused by the failure of the court
reporter to include in the transcript of the record a copy of the judgment.
Having ascertained, by the exercise of the power given under Rule 1.03, that
a judgment was in truth and in fact actually entered in the cause in the trial
court on the date mentioned it necessarily follows that the court should, by
order, correct the transcript of the record by including therein said judgment. Having made such an order the court has before it "a full transcript
of the record in the cause, including the bill of exceptions," as required by
Section 135 of the General Code for Civil Procedure and Supreme Court
Rule 1.04.
Section 2 of the new General Code for Civil Procedure provides that
said code "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Rule 1.28 of the Rules of the Supreme Court
provides: "These rules shall be liberally construed to promise justice, to
minimize the numbeA of cases disposed of on procedural question and to
facilitale and increase the disposition of cases on their merits." (Emphasis
ours.)
Keeping in mind the object and spirit of the new civil code and the new

supreme court rules, the court should not properly dismiss an appeal because
of the failure of the transcript to show a judgment, when by the simple exercise of the authority given us in Rule 1.03 it definitely and postively ascertains that there actually was a judgment entered in the trial court.80
Under Supreme Court Rule 1.04 (e) it is unnecessary to deliver a copy
of the transcripts to respondents if a printed abstract be filed and served
upon respondents not later than the date on which the appellant is required
8
to serve his original brief. '
4. Briefs
Where the appellant's statement, brief and argument (1) did not con-

tain any statement at all of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the court
80. Whealen v. St. Louis Soft Ball Ass'n., 198 S. W. (2d) 371 (Mo. App. 1946).
Yet, notice that the supreme court would not consider the constitutionality of
Section 98 of the General Code for Civil Procedure in a prohibition proceeding
where the return did not point out specifically wherein and why the statute violated
the constitution. State ex rel. Allison v. Barton, 197 S. W. (2d) 667 (Mo. 1946).
81. Foreman v. Foreman, 198 S. W. (2d) 873 (Mo. App. 1947).
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was invoked; (2) did not contain a fair and concise statement of the facts
without argument, but, on the contrary, was principally a diatribe or philippic, ironical and argumentative, of defendant's conclusions as to the effect
of the evidence; (3) did not state the points relied on, specifying the allegations of error, with citation of authorities thereunder, but, on the contrary,
under the heading of "Assignments of Error and Points Relied Upon," contained a verbatim copy of the specifications contained in defendant's motion
for a new trial, without citation of any authority whatever; and (4) this was
followed by an "Argument," a large part of which was entirely outside the
issues which had been tried, the court sustained the respondent's motion to
dismiss the appeal, as there was no semblance of even a substantial com82
pliance with the rules relating to appeals.
On the contrary, the court refused to sustain the respondent's motion
to dismiss an appeal on the ground that the appellant had not specified any
assignments of error in its brief, where, under its points, specifications of
alleged error were made for each point presented. 83 The supreme court overruled a motion to dismiss an appeal where the defendant's brief did not fully

comply with its rules (the statement of facts were neither properly made
nor in the proper place) and his transcript did not correctly show the final
amended judgment entered after remittitur. It found merit in the defendant's appeal, and on its own motion, ordered the clerk to send up the judg4
ment and thus determined that it was properly entered.
It is held that assignments of error, not supported by reasons, not
briefed, and not argued, must be treated as abandoned."'

c. Judgment on Appeal
1. Matters considered on appeal
Section 140 authorizes the appellate court to consider questions, raised
for the first time on appeal, challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court

over the subject matter and the sufficiency of the petition to state claim on
which relief can be granted."" It is also the duty of an appellate court to take
notice as to whether or not an appeal is premature, notwithstanding such
point is not raised by any party.87
82. Prewitt v. Zook, 197 S. W. (2d) 691 (Mo. App. 1946).
83. Crollard v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 200 S. W. (2d) 375 (Mo. App. 1947).
84. Feigenbaum v. Van Raaltc, 201 S. W. (2d) 283 (Mo. 1947). See also,
Ford v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 196 S. W. (2d) 163 (Mo. 1946).
85. JPetty v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 198 S. W. (2d) 684 (Mo. 1947).
86. State ex rel. Harwood v. Sartorius, 198 S. W. (2d) 690 (Mo. 1946).
87. Severs v. Williamson, 198 S. W. (2d) 368 (Mo. App. 1946).
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Further, under Supreme Court Rule 3.27, which permits plain errors
not raised in the trial court to be considered on appeal, the supreme court,
in an adoption case, investigated the question whether the consent of the
guardian of the person whose adoption was involved must be obtained,
though this point was raised for the first time on appeal. 8
2. Errors not affecting merits of the action
Appellate courts are courts of review, their prerogative being to protect
litigants who have lost in the trial court by reason of prejudicial errors that
may have occurred, but it is the express mandate of Section 140 that no appellate court shall reverse any judgment, unless it believes that error was
committed by the trial courts against the appellant, and materially affected
the merits of the action.8 9
In applying this statute, the appelate courts of Missouri have held that
the form of certain pleadings, 90 instructions, 9 and errors relating to the introduction of evidence 92 did not materially effect the merits of actions.
3. Proper judgment to give
Section 140 (c) provides that the appellate court shall examine the
transcript on appeal and, subject to the provisions above mentioned, shall
award a new trial or partial new trial; reverse or affirm the judgment or
order of the trial court; or give such judgment as the trial court ought to
have given agreeable to Iaw. Continuing the section says that, unless justice requires otherwise, the appellate court shall dispose finally of the
case on appeal. Paragraph (d) of the section sanctions the dismissal of a
case by the appellate court.9 3
In compliance with the injunction of Section 140 (c) for appellate courts
to dispose of cases finally when justice will permit, judgments were, during
the past year, affirmed " and reversed9" by appellate courts, and trial courts
were directed to enter judgments11
88. In re Duren, 200 S. W. (2d) 343 (Mo. 1947).
89. Brinkmann Realty Co. v. Deidesh'eimer, 201 S. W. (2d) 503 (Mo. App.
1947).
90. Murray v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 201 S. W. (2d) 775 (Mo. App.
1947).
91. Petty v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 198 S. W. (2d) 684 (Mo. 1947);
Crawford v. Byers Transportation Co., 201 S. W. (2d) 971 (Mo. 1947).
92. Grace v. Union Electric Co., 200 S. W. (2d) 364 (Mo. App. 1947).
93. State ex rel. Harwood v. Sartorius, 198 S. W. (2d) 690 (Mo. 1946).
94. Jankowski v. Delfert, 201 S. W., (2d) 331 (Mo. 1947).
95. Trantham v. Gullic, 201 S. W. (2d) 522 (Mo. App. 1947).
96. Axsom v. Thompson, 197 S. W. (2d) 326 (Mo. App. 1946).
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But it should be noticed that Section 140 (c) of the new code refers only
to appellate courts and requires such courts to refrain from ordering a new
trial as to issues in which no error appears, "unless justice requires otherwise."
Section 140 (c) is not applicable in a case where the trial court has exercised its discretion by granting an entire new trial. Said section applies
only in cases where no new trial has been ordered by the trial court and the
appellate court reverses the trial court's judgment and itself orders a new
trial. In other words, an affirmance by an appellate court of an order of a
trial court granting a new trial does not come within the provisions of Section 140 (c). An appellate court has no authority to interfere with the trial
court's exercise of its discretion in granting an entire new trial unless it
clearly appears that there has been an abuse of such discretion."
4. Transfer from Court of Appeals
Cases transferred to the supreme court from the courts of appeals are
treated as causes originally appealed to the supreme court. 5 A result of this
is that an appellant in a court of appeals retains his position as appellant if
his case is transferred to the supreme court 9

97. Blanford v. St Louis Public Service Co., 199 S. W. (2d) 887 (Mo. App.
1947).
98. State ex rel. Booker v. Bland, 197 S.W. (2d) 967 (Mo. 1946); In re Duren,
200 S. W. (2d) 343 (Mo. 1947).
99. In re Duren, iupra note 98.
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